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When the United Kingdom electorate voted by a majority of 52% to leave the European 
Union on 23rd June 2016 a shockwave was felt throughout the EU. Few had predicted 
the result not least the British Prime Minister David Cameron who had called the 
election and campaigned for a no vote. He resigned from his role as Prime Minister but 
the shockwaves continued to spread through the UK and around the world as the 
potential train crash Mr. Cameron had put in front of the UK became obvious. 
Nowhere did the shock resonate as much as in Dublin (O'Brennan, 2019). The impacts 
of Brexit would likely be significant for Ireland in a number of sectors – not least the 
fishing sector.  
Ireland’s original decision to join the EU was heavily influenced by the UK’s decision to 
seek membership. Irish reliance on UK markets meant that EU membership was 
imperative in order to safeguard Ireland’s economy. EU membership, however, was 
also seen as a means for Ireland to diversify its trade relations and so to lessen its 
economic dependency on the UK (Murphy, 2018a). Now the east/west economic 
relationship with the UK was threatened by the prospect of Brexit, while the fragile 
north/south relationship on the island of Ireland and the progress made under the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement would be jeopardised.   
Brexit, however, was not solely a UK crisis. The remaining 27 member states and 
European institutions were determined that Brexit would not have a domino effect 
leading to the disintegration of the Union (Laffan, 2019). Ireland, more than any other 
member state, stands to be deeply and profoundly impacted by UK departure from the 
EU. The crisis which Ireland faces is multi-dimensional: economic and political, 
constitutional and existential in nature (Murphy, forthcoming 2019). The Brexit 
referendum and the ensuing difficulties experienced by Ireland as a result of British 
indifference to the existential impact on the island of Ireland was the catalyst for a 
hugely significant diplomatic effort on the part of the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels and the Irish government to educate EU leaders about the dangers presented 
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by Brexit for Ireland (O'Brennan, Forthcoming 2020). The Irish fishing sector, already 
facing significant challenges brought about by climate change and Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) reforms as drivers of change, were quick off the blocks to express concerns 
about the referendum result. This is understandable given Irish and UK 
interdependence on fisheries issues and close interactions on many aspects of Irish and 
UK fisheries. Almost immediately, seafood industry leaders made statements 
expressing their reservations about the referendum result and the potential effects on 
the Irish seafood sector. A planning process was initiated by the Irish government to 
mitigate, in so far as possible, the negative effects that would surely be felt from Brexit. 
At the time of writing, the political situation in the UK is particularly volatile. Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson has stated his position as wanting the UK to leave the EU on 
31st October 2019, either with or without a deal. He gained the Queen’s consent to 
prorogue the UK parliament for a month, with a new session to commence with a 
Queen’s speech on 14th October 2019. The proroguing was viewed by opposition 
parties and some Tory party rebels as an attempt to stifle debate on Brexit and was 
countered with a Bill to force the UK government to ask for a three month extension 
from the EU if there is no agreed exit deal by 19th October 2019. Boris Johnson 
counteroffered the Bill with a proposal to hold a general election on 15th October, but 
his motion was rejected by the House of Commons as it didn’t attain the two thirds 
majority as required under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011. The opposition 
parties indicated they would be agreeable to a general election if the date for Brexit 
were moved to 31st January 2020. Johnson’s proroguing of parliament was referred to 
the UK Supreme Court and on 24th September 2019, the 11 judges unanimously found 
that Boris Johnson's decision to suspend Parliament for five weeks was unlawful. The 
House reconvened on 25th September 2019 to some farcical rhetoric and goading of 
the opposition by Johnson, as he invited them to set down a motion of no confidence 
in the Government (BBC News, 2019). The opposition did not table such a motion as it 
might have precipitated a hard Brexit by default. As it currently stands, the UK will 
leave the EU on or before the 31st October 2019 either under the terms of the 
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Withdrawal Agreement or with no deal, unless the UK and the EU agree to extend or 
revoke the Article 50 procedure. Boris Johnson is legally obliged to request an 
extension of Article 50 from the EU if a deal has not been agreed by 19th October 2019, 
but he is adamant that he will not do so. 
 
A solution must be found to Brexit and in arriving at that solution many sectors, 
including the seafood sector, will require specific sectoral solutions. The European 
Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has developed over the last 30 years with the  
aim of ensuring that fishing and aquaculture are environmentally, economically and 
socially sustainable and that they provide a source of healthy food for EU citizens. The 
goal of the CFP is to foster a dynamic fishing industry and ensure a fair standard of 
living for fishing communities. It is important to underpin the policy and maintain the 
ground that has been hard won in successive reforms of the policy over the last thirty 
years. The requirement for protein from the marine environment to feed the growing 
world population is increasing with global seafood consumption having more than 
doubled in the past 50 years to over 20 kg per capita per year in 2014 (Joint Research 
Centre, EU Commission, 2018).  As demand for seafood rises, production output from 
aquaculture and the sustainability of fish stock come sharply into focus. For millennia, 
the exploitation of wild fish stocks to sustain global populations has been practiced. 
However, in addition to climate change, modern technology and fishing methods have 
posed a threat to the sustainability of fish stocks. There are plenty of fish in the sea but 
prudent resource management, like that currently implemented under the CFP, is 
essential if we are to take enough from the sea to satisfy our food requirements, while 
also ensuring we manage the outtake in a manner that guarantees an everlasting 
resource for current and future generations.   
It is important for Ireland that any post-Brexit solution protects the Irish seafood sector 
and fosters the goals of the European Union’s CFP when the UK exits the EU. This thesis 
examines the development of the CFP, the structure of the Irish fishing fleet and fishing 
opportunities, Brexit and its impact on the seafood sector, and fisheries in the 
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International context. In particular, it will ask if there is an optimal post-Brexit solution 
from an Irish seafood perspective. To answer this question, it presents an analysis of 
literature, analyses primary and secondary information sources, and develops 
scenarios. The scenarios are analysed and ranked in order of suitability as an optimal 
solution that protects the Irish seafood sector and fosters the goals of the European 
Union’s CFP.  
Chapter 1 tracks the genesis and development, including reforms, of the CFP. 
Consideration is also given to other influential drivers of change, including climate 
change and the inevitable change in the way the EU will conduct its business in the 
future.  
Chapter 2 profiles the Irish fishing fleet, how fish resources are managed at a national 
level and where the Irish fleet catch and land their fish. 
Chapter 3 presents analysis on the profile and fishing patterns of the UK fishing fleet. 
North/south and east/west relations are strained by the Brexit process, and that has 
spilled over into north/south fishing arrangements and disputed fishing grounds. The 
effects of a hard Brexit on the fishing sector are set out and the significant impact on 
trade flows are analysed. 
Chapter 4 sets the international context for fisheries including trade, international 
fisheries management, prevention of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and 
current international fisheries agreements, with a particular emphasis on the EU 
Norway agreement. Scenarios for fisheries matched to the potential Brexit scenarios 
are developed, analysed and ranked on suitability from an Irish seafood perspective. 
The criteria used to evaluate suitable solutions for the Irish seafood sector for each 
scenario are:  
 access for Irish and other EU member states’ fishing vessels to fish in UK waters; 
 access to similar levels of fish stocks as heretofore;  
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 tariff-free trading arrangements between Irish and UK seafood markets 
(east/west and north/south);  
 avoidance of displacement of other EU Member States fishing fleets from UK 
waters into the Irish fishing zone.  
The core goal of the thesis is to establish if there is an optimum post-Brexit solution 
that fosters the principles of the CFP and protects our seafood sector. It is a principal 
concern that any solution protects the fabric of coastal communities, protects the 








This chapter will provide an overview of the development of the Common Fisheries 
Policy. An understanding of the genesis of policy parameters at European, national and 
international levels is important to set a baseline for analysis of the options open to the 
Irish Government in the post-Brexit era in seeking an optimal solution that protects the 
Irish seafood sector and fosters the goals of the European Union’s CFP 
The era of animals ranging wild over the land in Europe is all but gone, and agricultural 
activity is, in the main, carried out on parcels of land in private or shared ownership. 
The landowner’s ambition is usually to extract short-term benefit from that parcel of 
land by working it or renting it to a third party to work it. Fisheries are a shared, and 
often migratory, resource. That resource has to be environmentally, economically and 
socially sustained for the benefit of everyone sharing in the resource. The EU CFP has 
been developed to achieve those aims and provide a source of healthy food for EU 
citizens while also providing a fair standard of living for fishing communities. If the 
resource is correctly managed with long-term sustainability at its heart, it will continue 
to provide an endless source of protein.   
In more recent years, and in the face of diminishing wild fish stocks, aquaculture (fish 
farming) has become an ever increasingly important seafood protein source not just in 
Europe but worldwide. Aquaculture is more akin to terrestrial farming and is generally 
carried out on the foreshore, in lakes or in man-made closed systems with recirculating 
water. On examination of the current CFP (EU Common Fisheries Policy, 2013) and its 
associated funding programme, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 
(European Maritime & Fisheries Fund, 2014), it is clear to see that in addition to wild 
fisheries, a strong emphasis is also placed on developing aquaculture by the European 
Union institutions. While the negative effects of Brexit will undoubtedly also be 
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experienced by the aquaculture sector in areas including market access and trade, this 
thesis will focus principally on wild fisheries which face many additional challenges. 
 
The Treaties of the European Union 
 
Fisheries did not come up for a specific mention in the 1957 Treaty of Rome which 
came into force on 1st January 1958 (European Union, 1958). At that time, in post war 
Europe, the original six European Coal & Steel Community members had a relatively 
small proportion of fish in their diet and development of a more productive fishing 
sector was therefore not a priority. The original six Member States had little interest in 
fish stock conservation (Holden, 1994) and more emphasis was placed on agricultural 
produce with fisheries included under the agriculture umbrella. The treaty contained a 
clear legal basis for the establishment of a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and Article 
38(1) of the treaty states:  
 
“The internal market shall extend to agriculture, fisheries and trade in 
agricultural products. ‘Agricultural products’ means the products of the soil, of 
stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly 
related to these products. References to the common agricultural policy or to 
agriculture, and the use of the term ‘agricultural’, shall be understood as also 
referring to fisheries, having regard to the specific characteristics of this sector.” 
Whereas fisheries are presented as a subset of agriculture, Articles 38-44 of the Treaty 
of Rome provide a legal basis for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  
 
The objectives set for agriculture in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome which applied to 
agriculture & fisheries products are: 
a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and 
by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the 
optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
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b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture; 
c) to stabilise markets; 
d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty (European Union , 1993) came into force on 1st November 
1993 and provides a basis for a CFP separately to the CAP. The Maastricht Treaty also 
introduced the overall concept of subsidiarity which paved the way for the EU 
Commission to manage fisheries for the benefit of all EU member states. The objectives 
(a to e above) were reiterated in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which came into force on 1st 
December 2009 (European Union, 2009) and indeed have remained practically 
unchanged for agriculture and fisheries to the present day, although the associated 
policies (CAP and the CFP) have seen some divergence from each other over that 
period. Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as 
revised by the Lisbon Treaty identified the conservation and management of marine 
biological resources as an exclusive EU competence. Co-decision (the European 
Parliament or the Council may not adopt legislation without the other’s assent) was 
established as the ordinary legislative procedure (standard procedure for all EU 
decision making) for most areas of the CFP. It is noteworthy that one of the areas of 
competence excluded from co-decision and which remains a competence of the 
Council is the setting of fishing opportunities. Ministers and their officials often meet in 
marathon, through-the-night sessions at the December Council of Fisheries Minister’s 




At the London Fisheries Convention of 1964, territorial waters of participating states 
(12 in total) was agreed to be 12 nautical miles (NM) and later ratified in the London 
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Fisheries Convention Treaty Series 1966 No1 (London Fisheries Convention Treaty 
Series 1966 No.1, 1964). In addition, the traditional fishing rights of certain states 
within the 12 NM zone of others was recognized and formalised within the document 
agreed at the convention. This inter alia formalised Ireland’s right to fish within UK 
territorial waters. Access arrangements set at the London Fisheries Convention were 
later recognized in Annex 1 of the CFP regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the 
European Parliament, 2013) rendering the London Fisheries Convention and the 
associated treaty somewhat redundant on this point as all the signatories were also EU 
Member States. In 2017 the UK became concerned that in a post-Brexit scenario, 
where the CFP would no longer apply and the UK could exclude non-UK fishing vessels, 
signatories to the treaty could claim access to certain UK territorial waters on the basis 
of the London Fisheries Convention. On 3rd July 2017 the UK Government gave formal 
notice of withdrawal from the London Fisheries Convention agreement. A notice period 
of two years was required and that notice period was intended to dovetail with the 
triggering of Article 50 (see Chapter 3). Whereas the Article 50 withdrawal period has 
since been extended, the UK London Fisheries Convention notice period expired on 3rd 
July 2019 and the UK automatically withdrew from the London Fisheries Convention on 
that date. However, the UK withdrawal from the London Fisheries Convention will have 
no implications while the UK remains an EU member state. 
From 1972 through to 1983, the landscape for Irish fisheries changed significantly. 
Initiatives that were implemented for Irish fisheries over the previous two decades had 
started to pay dividends. In addition to private investment in larger fishing vessels, the 
Irish government offered financial supports for the introduction of new and/or 
replacement fishing vessels into the fishing fleet.  
Immediately prior to, and following, Ireland’s accession to the EEC in 1973 work on a 
CFP was progressed. However, even during this time, fish stocks were not considered a 
real shared resource that merited management at a European level and national 
fisheries management was considered an adequate measure. It is therefore not 
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surprising that it took a further ten years of work and negotiation before the common 
fisheries policy was finally agreed on the 25th January 1983 (Lado, 2016). Later, in 
1976, Ireland and most other coastal EU member states extended their EEZs to 200 
miles. 
 
Equal Access to Community Waters 
 
Following applications for membership of the EEC from Ireland, UK, Norway and 
Denmark, the question of jurisdiction over fishing areas arose. The rich fishing grounds 
surrounding the UK and Ireland had been a traditional source of a large proportion of 
the catch of the six existing community members. An estimated 90% of the fish landed 
by the six had been caught outside of their own territorial waters. By Article 2.1 of 
Regulation 2141/70 (Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 of the Council, 1970) it was 
established   
Rules applied by each Member State in respect of fishing in the maritime 
waters coming under its sovereignty or within its jurisdiction shall not 
lead to differences in treatment of other Member States. 
 
Member States shall ensure in particular equal conditions of access to 
and use of the fishing grounds situated in the waters referred to in the 
preceding subparagraph for all fishing vessels flying the flag of a 
Member State and registered in Community territory. 
 
This subsequently became a constituent part of the Acquis Communautaire (the 
accumulated legislation, legal acts and court decisions that constitute the body of 
European Union law) that all candidate countries had to adopt to achieve membership 
of the EEC. The regulation came into effect just hours before accession negotiations 
with Ireland, UK, Norway and Denmark commenced and it has remained in please to 
the present day. It is often seen as a bone of contention by Irish fishermen who accuse 
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Ireland’s accession negotiators of turning their backs on the Irish fishing industry in 
favor of agriculture and structural funds. Their argument is that Ireland’s rich fishing 
waters would have been more valuable in the long-term, but the reality is that it was 
enshrined in the acquis and a candidate country either accepts the acquis in full or 
does not join. Another reality is that Irish fishermen did not keep adequate historical 
catch records and official data records relatively low catches by the then 
underdeveloped Irish fishing fleet (Ireland had no deep sea fishing fleet at that time). 
‘The Sea Around Us’ project conducted at the University of British Columbia (Sea 
Around Us, 2016) allows the reconstruction of Irish fisheries data from 1950 to present 
day (currently available up to 2014). These data include official reported data and 
adjustments for underreporting. Examination of these data for Ireland’s pre and post 
EEC accession years clearly shows that Ireland did not lose out on fishing opportunities 
to other EU Member States after joining the EEC in 1973.     
 
Although it may be little consolation to the naysayers, and often ignored by them, the 
accession negotiators did secure a deal to reserve access to the 12 NM zone for Irish 
fishing vessels and foreign fishing vessels with a history of traditionally fishing in those 
areas (those allowed under the London Fisheries Convention1 which also recognized 
neighborhood or Voisinage arrangements) (Farnell & Elles, 1984). This arrangement, 
which was initially introduced for a period of ten years, has since been renewed on a 
rolling basis and remains in force today. In the absence of this arrangement, fishing 
vessels from other member states could fish up to the Irish coastline. This is 
noteworthy in the context of Brexit and will be revisited later.  
 
EU Regulation 170/83 (Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83, 1983) sets out, in the EU 
context, the conclusions of the 1964 London Fisheries Convention to establish exclusive 
6 and 12 nm zones and set out entitlements of other Member States to fish in these 
                                                          
1 Spain which was entitled to fish in the Irish 12nm zone on the basis of traditional fishing patterns and 




zones on the basis of established traditional fishing patterns. In the context of the pre 
1973 absence of a deep sea fishing fleet in Ireland, it is noteworthy that, in general, 
Irish fishermen fished only in Irish waters and arrangements within the 12 NM zones of 
other countries were of little value or interest to Irish fishermen. EU Regulation 170/83 
made provision for Irish vessels to fish in the UK 12 NM zone while it underpinned 
access for France, UK, Netherlands, Germany and Belgium to fish in the Irish 6-12 NM 
zone. These arrangements continue to be in place to the present day. 
 
Between 12 NM and 200 NM, all EU member states were afforded rights to fish in each 
other’s zones but despite the earlier investment, Irish fishing vessels were generally 
small and incapable of prosecuting off shore sea fisheries.  
 
Access to Third Country Waters     
 
During the mid-1970s many countries, including European countries, made 
declarations to extend the territorial limits to 200 NM. This led to difficulties for some 
European countries that had traditionally fished in third country waters, and in some 
cases led to disputes on the fishing grounds (for example the Icelandic cod wars were a 
series of confrontations between the UK and Iceland related to access by UK fishing 
vessels to rich cod fishing grounds around Iceland which ultimately resulted in the UK 
losing access to the grounds that UK fishermen had fished since the 1500s) 
(Jóhannesson, 2004). 
 
Negotiations on access arrangements to third country waters, including Norway which 
by now had decided to remain outside of the EEC, were carried out by the EU 
Commission on behalf of EU Member States. This topic is relevant in the context of 





Fair Distribution of Scarce Resources Between Competing Users 
 
During CFP negotiations it became apparent that a system for the fair distribution of 
fishery resources among competing EU member states would have to be devised.  
 
Allocation of fishing resources was to be by means of Total Allowable Catch (TAC). TACs 
were set on the basis of traditional fishing activities and official records of outtakes 
were used as a basis to establish distribution keys and the concept of Relative Stability 
was thus enshrined in the process (Morin, 2000). Under relative stability a fixed 
percentage of the Total Allowable Catch for each fish stock is allocated to each 
member state based on that member state’s fishing track record of that particular 
stock in that particular geographical area. Whereas it is possible for relative stability 
keys to be amended, the norm is that relative stability does not change from year to 
year other than if the Hague Preferences (see below) are invoked. 
 
For relative stability reference years, Ireland’s official fish landing data displayed low 
records of fishing activities in Irish waters and little or no history of fishing activities in 
third country waters. Official recording of landings seem to have been somewhat 
unreliable in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with anecdotal evidence that fishermen were 
keen to hide the true picture of their fishing operations from the Irish tax authorities. 
Accordingly, when the initial allocation of stocks was made in 1983 Ireland’s allocation 
was low when compared to other member states which, in turn, led to low relative 
stability keys for Ireland in many fish stocks. To put this in context for important Irish 
fisheries, for example, the initial Irish allocations of pelagic fish (mackerel and herring) 
in Irish waters was 23% of the TAC and the initial allocations of demersal fish (cod, 
haddock, saithe, whiting, hake, plaice and sole) in Irish waters was 18%. 
 
The Hague Preferences often arise in the context of discussion and negotiation at the 
December Council of European Fisheries Ministers. In 1975, Ireland, the UK and 
Greenland had voiced concerns about the calculation of relative stability at the pre CFP 
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negotiation phase. In Ireland’s case, the issues related to the under development of the 
fishing fleet in the reference years and the substantial burden placed on Ireland to 
control the fishing activity of all member states fishing fleets operating in the Irish EEZ 
(Farnell & Elles, 1984).  
 
Ireland made a robust case to be allowed scope to develop its fishing fleet (in particular 
the pelagic fleet which target Atlantic mackerel, herring, horse mackerel, etc.). Irish 
negotiators pitched to compensate for an underdeveloped fishing fleet in the 
reference years, given Irish dependence on fishing grounds close to the Irish coast at 
that time, by facilitating development of the Irish fishing fleet and the introduction of 
larger fishing vessels that could fish further from the Irish coast.  
 
Dr. Garrett Fitzgerald was the Irish Foreign Minister of the day. His ability, affability, 
appetite for hard work, and genuine idealism, reinforced by his fluency in French, made 
a startling impact on European foreign ministers and officials, unaccustomed to Irish 
performers of his calibre (Lee, 1989). He had succeeded in obtaining cast-iron 
assurances that the development of the Irish fishing industry would be dealt with 
sympathetically (Farnell & Elles, 1984). In recognition of the issues presented by 
Ireland, and similar issues presented by UK and Greenland, an agreement was made in 
the Hague which guaranteed those member states a minimum quota of certain fish 
stocks if the TAC calculation fell below an agreed trigger point. Greenland has had self-
rule since 1979 and has not been a member of the EU since 1985. As a third country, it 
cannot now avail of the Hague Preferences.  
 
The Hague Preferences currently permit Ireland and/or the UK to invoke a system that 
results in additional quota, over and above that which Ireland would be entitled to 
under its relative stability key, being allocated if the TAC drops below a certain 
threshold. The Hague Preferences constitute and integral part of relative stability 
(Lado, 2016) but TAC allocation is a zero-sum equation, so any increase granted under 
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the Hague Preferences has to be ceded by other EU member states (Germany, France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands). It is therefore understandable that invoking of the 
Hague Preferences is often met with resistance from the member states that have to 
give up quota, and invocation is often met with proposals to eliminate the Hague 
Preferences as a tool available to Ireland and UK. Detail on the calculation of relative 
stability keys and metrics for the application of Hague Preferences are beyond the 
scope of this thesis but can be found in Holden (1994).   
 
Post-Brexit, as it currently stands, the UK will not be able to rely on the Hague 
Preferences. This situation is, of course, subject to change as an element of 
Brexit/post-Brexit negotiations. The UK is Ireland’s most important ally within the 
European Council and Council of Ministers in Brussels (O'Brennan, 2019) but in a post-
Brexit scenario, Ireland will have to fight alone to keep the Hague Preferences in place. 
This merits further attention later. 
 
Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources    
 
Measures to manage fish stocks, including capping fishing effort and setting technical 
measures (such as defining the fishing net mesh size deployed to target certain species 
in particular areas), protection for juvenile fish (by introducing minimum landing sizes 
for fish and designating areas that are closed to fishing on a permanent or temporary 
basis) were, and continue to be, negotiated and agreed. Such measures are 
cornerstones in the implementation of the CFP today (Lado, 2016). 
 
To measure the achievement of CFP conservation goals, performance metrics are 
required. These include assessment of the potential fishing effort that can be deployed 
(by measuring the capacity of the EU fishing fleet at a national level), recording 
outtakes of fish and implementing a control and enforcement regime to oversee 
implementation of CFP measures. The balance between fishing capacity and fishing 
opportunities later became, and remains, a key metric and member states are obliged 
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to maintain a balance between the size of their fishing fleet and the fishing 
opportunities available to that fleet. In the event of an imbalance the member state is 
obliged to implement a remediation plan to restore the fleet/opportunities balance. 
That remediation plan may include the removal of fleet capacity with public aid 
(decommissioning) provided under the CFP funding programmes. Implementation of 
these measures is underpinned by two legal instruments. EU Regulation 170/83, also 
referenced earlier in the context of establishing exclusive 6 and 12 mile zones, broadly 
included the principles for the conservation and management of a common fishery 
resource while the other, EU Regulation 172/83 (Council Regulation (EEC) No 172/83, 
1983), sets out technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources. 
 
Reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy 
 
From 1983 to date the CFP has seen a number of reforms at approximately ten year 
intervals (1992, 2002 and 2013). These reforms have occurred synchronously with CAP 
reforms underpinning the close links between the two policies. The principles at the 
core of the CFP have survived through the reforms, albeit with some adjustment.  
 
The 1992 reform was limited in its ambition and conservative in approach and 
although some problems with the CFP had already been identified it did little to 
address those problems opting instead for the preservation of the status quo (Lado, 
2016). The 1992 basic regulation’s (Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92, 1992) principle goal 
was to address the imbalance between fishing fleet capacity and the fishing 
opportunities available. The regulation introduced the concept of ‘fishing effort’ and 
access to resources through a licensing system. This was significant to Ireland as, while 
a shipping register for large ships (including large fishing vessels) was maintained in 
Ireland up to that point, there was no register of all fishing vessels. Ireland would have 




The 2002 reform was delivered in December 2002 with three regulations (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, 2002) (Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 
2369/2002, 2002) (Council Regulation (EC) No 2370/2002, 2002) establishing measures 
to address depleting fish stock resulting from overfishing and providing for a reduction 
in the EU fishing fleet by means of a funded decommissioning (scrapping) scheme. 
 
The principle goal of the 2002 reform, and one of the founding principles of the CFP, 
was to underpin a sustainable future for the fisheries sector and secure adequate 
incomes and jobs for fishermen (Lado, 2016). The reform also aspired to preserve the 
balance of marine biological resources and ecosystems while also introducing the long-
term approach to fisheries management that we know and still use today, including 
multiannual recovery plans (for stocks outside safe biological limits) and multiannual 
management plans (for other stocks). 
 
At the same time, the 2002 reform also established the European Fisheries Control 
Agency (EFCA) whose role would be to control fishing activities and oversee 
enforcement of compliance with the CFP and Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) 
comprised of various marine stakeholders to allow those stakeholders, including 
fishermen, to have input into the development of future policy. Another key impact of 
this reform was that it put an end to the policy of grant aiding new fishing vessels to 
enter the EU fishing fleet.  
 
The 2013 reform was a significant reform and was based on three pillars: 
 The new CFP (Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament, 2013)  
 The common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products 
(Regulation (EU) No 1379/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
2013) 
 The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (European Maritime & 




The 2013 reform introduced multiannual ecosystem-based management, to 
complement the concept of multiannual plans that were introduced in the 2002 
reform, with multi-species and fisheries plans in the European geographical areas. It 
introduced a unique structure, within the EU context, of regional decision making in 
association with stakeholders and advisory bodies. (e.g. the North Western Waters 
Advisory Council) with the aim of bringing the decision-making process closer to the 
fishing grounds. This is a good example of practical application of the EU policy of 
subsidiarity.   
 
Following a very effective 2010 political campaign (Fish Fight) initiated by TV celebrity 
chef Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall, widespread reforms to the policy of discarding fish 
were introduced and the landing obligation (which requires fishermen to land all fish 
and cease the practice of discarding by 2019) was tabled for introduction on a phased 
basis. The concept of setting targets at Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for each 
stock and all fisheries by 2020 was also introduced. 
 
The reform obliges member states to adjust their fishing fleet capacity so that they are 
in balance with their fishing opportunities and small scale fisheries were identified for 
special favourable attention under the reformed policy. In addition, the exclusion of 
other fishing fleets (other than those with established traditional fishing rights) from 
the 12 NM zone of a member state was extended under Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 
until 2022. 
 
To underpin the above measures, additional data collection, sharing of information 
(relating to fish stocks, fishing fleets and the impact of fishing activities) and control 




The common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products was 
introduced with the intention of encouraging producers to provide the right product 
for the right market at the right time and achieve the best available price for that 
product. As a result of the reform, the European consumer can now expect to see 
common marketing standards with uniform characteristics for seafood sold in the EU. 
 
The financial instrument in support of the CFP reform (the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund 2014-2020) provides supports for the transition to sustainable fishing. It 
includes supports for coastal communities diversification effort, supports creation of 
new jobs in the sector, strives to improve quality of life in coastal communities, 
supports sustainable aquaculture developments and improves the common 
organisation of the markets for fishery and aquaculture products through the provision 
of funding to producer organisations. 
 
Climate Change  
 
Climate change is drastically altering how the EU does its business in the fisheries 
policy area. Fluctuation in both the range and distribution of fish stocks in our oceans 
has been attributed to climate change. In Ireland, a team in the Marine Institute (MI) in 
Galway (led by Dr. Paul Connolly) is conducting ongoing assessment of the likely 
impacts of climate change on the seafood sector.  
In chapter 5 of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper 627 (Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations, 2018) Peck and Pinnegar detail the impact of climate change on 
North Atlantic and Atlantic Arctic marine fisheries and identify, inter alia, changes in 
ocean temperatures leading to changing distribution of fish stocks with impacts on 
recruitment and productivity of fish stocks. Increasing acidification of the oceans and 
alteration in zooplankton distribution is already having negative effects in the oceans. 
Climate change is expected to have grave geopolitical and economic consequences 
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alongside with a probable threat to food security. Increasing world population growth 
is also expected to put pressure on fish markets and lead to higher fish prices. 
 
Projections suggest that if the current trend in climate change continues, more than 
800 species of marine fish and invertebrates are expected to shift towards the poles 
65% faster than if the low–emission target of two degrees celsius is achieved (Gattuso, 
et al., 2015). Some of these effects are already evident in Europe and a shift in 
distribution of marine species has occurred. ICES provided advice to the European 
Commission in 2017 detailing that 16 out of 21 fish species examined have shown 
changes in their distribution across the north east Atlantic since 1985. The drivers of 
change in distribution are linked to environmental conditions - mainly sea temperature 
- but fishing also played a role for some species. Hake, mackerel, anchovy, cod, herring, 
horse mackerel, plaice and common sole have shifted their relative distribution 
between different management areas or into areas not currently covered by TAC’s. 
Continued monitoring of the spatial distribution of fish stocks is essential to support 
future management. With the shift in stock distribution comes an expectation that the 
states with new stocks now appearing off their coasts should get a share in that fishery. 
This has been evident in the annual Coastal States North Atlantic mackerel 
negotiations. The EU often struggle to apply available policy and fisheries governance 
instruments to handle this change effectively (Harte, et al., 2019).  
 
A Change in How the EU Does Business  
 
The EU has faced a series of serious issues in recent years, including the economic 
crises, the refugee crises, strengthening the Schengen system and differing views on EU 
enlargement. The EU responses to the Euro and migration crises may have alleviated 
the immediate danger facing the EU, but the political fallout from the polycrisis, in the 
form of populism, Euroscepticism, and deep public dissatisfaction, remains acute 
(Dinan, 2019). The EU’s capacity to absorb shocks had strengthened as the EU had 
been tested and contested through crises (Laffan, 2018). The way the EU carries out its 
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business has also been tested and stressed. The Community method modus operandi 
of conducting business at EU level (including advances made in the development of the 
CFP) has, until relatively recently, been based on qualified majority voting and, in the 
main, on consensus agreements made between member states usually negotiated by 
officials in the first instance and later formally agreed at Ministerial councils. This 
process has always involved some give and take and willingness to compromise. The 
multilateral bargaining forum facilitated both functional and normative adaptions by 
the member states (O'Brennan, 2019). This modus operandi now faces a danger of 
being eroded as Brexit puts additional strain on the system. There is a marked shift 
away from the Community method (which includes a role for supranational institutions 
and non-state actors (Jensen, 2016)) towards intergovernmentalism which sees 
decision making moving away from supranational organisations and a more central 
role being taken by national governments (Cini, 2016). A move towards 
Intergovernmentalism, and possible zero-sum agreements seems to herald a 
retrospective step in terms of developing the EU project.  
 
In the Brexit negotiations we have witnessed that the theories of international 
relations and political economy: realism, liberalism and constructivism will come into 
play. The EU 27 has negotiated as one unit despite the best efforts of the UK to divide 
and conquer and the particular UK ploy to isolate Ireland with accusations of 
obstructing progress by insisting on retaining the backstop while the reality was that 
the UK failed to propose any alternative to the backstop.  
 
Liberalism views international relations as driven by global economic interdependence 
(Hix & Hoyland, 2011). Liberalists are not concerned about where the geographical 
borders of a state lie, but rather how the states can co-operate to enhance the 
economic return to the collective. To achieve this economic goal, liberalists are willing 
to see closer co-operation and the formation of international institutions between 
states e.g. set standards and enforce trade rules to enhance the economic viability of 
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the collective. The EU/UK Brexit negotiations have seen the EU 27 bond strengthened 
and close cooperation is evident and is paying dividends. It is conceivable that a union 
which was in danger of disintegration at the commencement of Brexit leverages the 
adage of “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger” to build a closer future bond.  
 
Realism sees international relationships between states as a continuous struggle for 
power and domination between states in a system of anarchy (Hix & Hoyland, 2011) 
with each state predicting how others are likely to behave. Realism also sees close 
cooperation between states as difficult in some areas (e.g. security) and sovereign 
governments continue to make their own decisions on the difficult issues. The 
neorealist approach that Boris Johnson has adopted to Brexit is a working example of 
the issues that can arise. The Intergovernmental theory of EU politics has relied on this 
model to date, with sovereign states often opting out of EU wide arrangements (e.g. 
Ireland and the UK opting out of the Schengen Area).  
 
Neorealism presents many challenges in advancing the EU project and EU policy 
development, including CFP development, becomes almost impossible in a structure 
where co-decision has been adopted as the ordinary legislative procedure and 




The CFP had its genesis in the Common Agricultural Policy and still shares some 
common goals. Both aim to provide an environmentally, economically and socially 
sustainable source of healthy food for EU citizens, while supporting a reasonable living 
standard for the fishermen and farmers of Europe. The EU treaties provide the 
overarching framework for the CFP. The treaties also provide a platform for the sharing 
of resources among EU member states, and empowering the European institutions to 
make decisions pertaining to the 200 NM waters of member states pooled to form EU 
Community waters and systems that have been developed to underpin the fair 
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distribution of resources in Community waters and in third country waters. The CFP has 
been reformed, and will be further reformed, to bolster the conservation and 
management of aquatic resources.  
 
Reform of the CFP has ensured the guiding principles of the policy have been 
maintained while the key priorities are identified as ensuring that EU fishing and 
aquaculture sectors are environmentally, economically and socially sustainable, marine 
biological resources are protected and exploited at maximum sustainable yield and the 
discarding of fish is discontinued. 
 
The CFP is not without its detractors but it must be acknowledged as a successful policy 
to date. Climate change is a challenge to the CFP and adaptation and mitigation 
measures must be included as an integral part of the CFP going forward. Brexit, 
however, poses a threat to the way the EU operates and the development of policies 








This chapter presents an overview of the structure and management of the Irish Sea-
fishing fleet, the fishing grounds prosecuted by the Irish fishing fleet and the fleets of 
other EU member states that fish in the Irish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
Arrangements for allocating fishing quotas to individual Irish sea-fishing boats are 
discussed with particular reference to how the landings from those vessels are 
recorded to ensure that Ireland remains within the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) 
allocated by the EU Commission on foot of decisions made at the December Council of 
Fisheries Ministers annual quota meeting. Key statistics on catching patterns, landings, 
employment in the seafood sector (including inshore fisheries, aquaculture activities 
and seafood processing) as well as the value of the sector are presented. Trade in 
seafood (imports and exports) is addressed and the fisheries support infrastructure 
provided through the state-owned and operated Fishery Harbour Centres located 
around the Irish coast is described. An understanding of these baselines is crucial to the 
analysis of the effects of Brexit.   
 




The Irish Seafood sector plays a significant role in the Irish food industry with a value of 
€1.25 billion in 2018 while sea fisheries are worth €401 million per annum on fish 
landings from both Irish and non-Irish fishing vessels into Irish ports and harbours. 
Government investment in the sector amounted to €170m in 2018 while private 







Figure 2.1 Irish Seafood Sector 2018 Financial Overview  
 
Source: (Bord Iascaigh Mhara, 2018) 
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Exports of Irish seafood in 2018 reduced by 4% on the previous year to €653M This dip 
in the trend is due to a number of challenges across the seafood category but a 
particular challenge was noted in salmon farming which declined by 36% as the 
industry struggled to overcome limits on production capacity (Bord Bia, 2019). The 
Asian market has become an increasingly important market for Irish Seafood, with 
strong demand for shellfish (Razor Clams, Crab, Lobster, Whelk, etc.). Seafood exports 
to Asia continued to grow with an increase of 52% in value in 2018. Exports to Nigeria 




Imports of seafood into Ireland reduced by 2% to €330m and amounted to 143,800 
tonnes.  
Figure 2.2 Irish Seafood Trade 2018  
 
Source: (Bord Iascaigh Mhara, 2018) 
 
Irish seafood exports account for 5% of the total food and drink exports from Ireland. 
Bord Bia shows that seafood exports have experienced the largest increase in export 
value (Figure 2.3) in the food and drink sector over the period 2009 to 2016 with an 
89% increase in value and a 37% increase in volume over the same period (Figure 2.4). 
However that growth trend was reversed somewhat in 2018 with a 4% decrease in 
value. Seafood exports to the UK in 2018 were valued at €81m or 12.4% of total 
seafood exports from Ireland. Seafood imports from the UK to Ireland were valued at 
€219m in 2018 or 66% of total Irish seafood imports (Board Iascaigh Mhara, 2018). In 
the context of Brexit, the UK remains a significant seafood trading partner. Seafood 
imports from the UK are important as a source of raw material for Irish seafood 
processors. Ports like Grimbsy in the UK are recognised seafood hubs for third country 
seafood imports to the EU. It is likely, that in the event of a hard Brexit, alternative 
routes may be established to allow such third country trade continue without the 
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double imposition of tariffs. That aside, the UK is a significant seafood trading partner 
and account must be taken of this when considering the effects of Brexit on the Irish 
seafood sector.   
Figure 2.3 Growth in Value (€) of Irish Seafood Exports 2009 to 2017 
 
Source: (Bord Bia, 2019) 
 
Figure 2.4 Growth in Volume of Irish Seafood Exports 2009 to 2017  
 





The Irish Seafood sector provides direct and indirect employment for 14,359 people 
around the coast of Ireland, with total direct employment of 9,048 and 5,311 indirectly 
employed in the seafood sector. Of the 9,048 direct employees, 3,231 were employed 
in fisheries, 1,925 in aquaculture and 3,892 in seafood processing. 
 
Figure 2.5 Irish Seafood Employment 2018  
 
Source: (Bord Iascaigh Mhara, 2018) 
 
Coastal communities in Ireland are highly dependent on the seafood sector as an 
employer and for generation of economic activity. In the North West 12% of total 
employment is provided by the seafood sector. In Killybegs, the principal fishing port in 
the North West, the seafood sector accounts for 82% of economic activity (GDP).   
 
Figure 2.6 Dependence on Employment in the Seafood Sector by Region  
 
Source: (Bord Iascaigh Mhara, 2018) 
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The Irish Sea-fishing Fleet 
 
According to the Licensing Authority for Sea-fishing Boats, there were 2005 (including 
aquaculture work boats) registered sea-fishing vessels in the Irish sea-fishing fleet on 
31st December 2018 (Licensing Authority for Sea-Fishing Boats, 2018). The total 
capacity of the Irish sea-fishing fleet expressed in Gross Tons (GT) (measure of volume 
of a sea-fishing vessel) and Kilowatts (Kw) (measure of engine power of a sea-fishing 
vessel) was 63,914 GT and 188559 Kw on 31 December 2018 (Licensing Authority for 
Sea-Fishing Boats, 2018).  Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 sets Ireland’s  Fishing  
Capacity  Ceiling  in  terms  of  gross  tonnes  (GT)  and Kilowatts  (kW) for the fishing 
fleet. Ireland’s  fishing fleet capacity  ceiling  was  calculated  by  taking  Ireland’s  
Reference  Level,  established  on  1  January  2003  by  EU  Council  Regulation  
2371/2002, and adding increases in tonnage granted under the “safety tonnage” 
provisions that applied to 31 December 2013, and subtracting any exits from the fleet 
financed by public aid, i.e. through the Decommissioning Schemes. Taking into account 
these adjustments Ireland’s fleet ceiling stood at 77,568 GTs and 210,083 Kw on 31st 
December 2018 (Licensing Authority for Sea-Fishing Boats, 2018).  
 
Fleet ceilings were set for each EU member state’s fishing fleet to cap the maximum 
fishing effort by EU sea-fishing vessels in EU waters. Ireland (and all other EU member 
states) is obliged to ensure that the fishing capacity of its fleet does not exceed the 
fishing capacity ceiling set. Entries into, and exits from, the Irish sea-fishing fleet are 
carefully managed by the Registrar General for Sea-fishing Boats (head of the licensing 
authority for sea-fishing boats). At 31st December 2018 there was 14,337 GTs and 
12,265 Kw held “off register” and therefore not assigned to active sea-fishing boats 
(Licensing Authority for Sea-Fishing Boats, 2018).    
 
The Licensing Authority for Sea-fishing Boats was established under the Fisheries 
(Amendment) Act 2003 (Government of Ireland, 2003). The licensing authority is 
independent in the exercise of performing the role of licensing sea-fishing boats and is 
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subject to domestic and EU law and policy directives given in writing and laid before 
the Houses of the Oireachtas by the Minister. 
 
Irish Sea-fishing Fleet Segmentation 
 
The Irish sea-fishing fleet is divided into five segments (two of the five segments have 
further sub-segments) with transfer of capacity between segments and between sub-
segments prohibited. Accordingly, a sea-fishing boat being introduced into a fleet 
segment must be compensated by the withdrawal of at least the same amount of 
capacity from the same segment/sub-segment (the Aquaculture segment is not subject 
to the entry/exit regime). Figure 2.7 shows the segments and sub-segments that are 
subject to the entry/exit regime along with the number of vessels in each segment at 
31st December 2018. Restrictions apply to capacity in some of the segments and sub-
segments below (e.g. capacity in the Polyvalent Potting sub-segment cannot be sold or 
traded but it can be passed on to an immediate family relative to continue a tradition 
of fishing by means of pots only).  
Ireland’s Sea-fishing Fleet by Segment and Sub-segment 
 
Figure 2.7 Irish Sea-fishing Fleet Segments  




Beam  Trawler  Segment  10 
Polyvalent  Segment  1,721 
 vessels under 18m in length overall  




 Scallop sub-segment  
 Potting sub-segment  
Specific  Segment  153 
 Scallop  sub-segment  
 Specific  general  sub-segment  
Aquaculture Segment  98 
Total  2005 
Source: (Licensing Authority for Sea-Fishing Boats, 2018) 
Approximately 1,500 of the 2,005 vessels could be considered inshore fishing vessels. 
These are small vessels that fish close to the coast and generally return to port at the 
end of the fishing day. While inshore vessels have access to quota species, they 
predominantly target non-quota species such as Lobster, Crab, Razor Clams, Whelk, 
etc. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority (SFPA) landing data for the Irish fishing fleet 
(Sea Fisheries Protection Authority, 2018) show that the 400 larger vessels account for 
the bulk of fish landings by Irish sea-fishing boats. These 400 sea-fishing boats generally 
fish further off shore, undertake fishing trips that last a number of days and have the 
capacity to fish and land large volumes of fish. The remainder of this chapter will 
concentrate on the activities of these 400 larger sea-fishing boats. 
 
The Fishing Grounds 
 
The waters of the EU are mapped and referenced with management blocks devised by 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) (International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea , n.d.). The ICES divisions around Ireland are shown in Figure 
2.8. Restrictions often apply to TACs based on these ICES divisions, for example 
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separate TACs apply to the area east of the 4˚ line of longitude and west of that line. A 
TAC cannot be transferred across the 4˚ line or for example fishing for certain species 
may be prohibited in a particular functional unit based on scientific data showing a 
recovery requirement for that stock in that particular functional unit. Subject to any 
restrictions imposed it is open to EU fishing vessels to take their catch from EU waters. 
In the share out of fishing opportunities, Ireland receives TACs for over 40 commercial 
fish stocks. 
 






What are European Union Waters? 
 
EU waters are the composite waters out to 200 NM from the baselines of each EU 
member state. Under Article 5 of EU Regulation 1380/2013 on the CFP (EU Common 
Fisheries Policy, 2013) member states are authorised, until 2022, to restrict fishing 
within the 6 NM to 12 NM zone of their coast to vessels that traditionally fished those 
waters and are listed in Annex 1 of the regulation. Member states have national 
competence over waters in the 0 NM to 6 NM Zone although Ireland has a 
neighbourhood arrangement (recognised within the CFP) with Northern Ireland to 
allow reciprocal access to each other’s 0-6 NM zone. It is noteworthy that the 
operation of this “Voisinage” arrangement was found not to have a basis in Irish 
Statute in a Supreme Court judgment in 2016 and the arrangement was suspended in 
the Irish 0-6 NM zone pending the commencement of the Sea Fisheries (Amendment) 
Act 2019. This is significant in the context of Brexit and will be covered in detail in 
chapter 3.  
    
The European Union Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
The European Union’s EEZ currently stands at 4,371,100 km2 taking the product of 
individual member states EEZ’s (including the North East Atlantic, Mediterranean, 
Baltic and North Seas but excluding overseas territories). Ireland’s EEZ is 437,500 km2 
which currently accounts for 10% of the overall EU area. That percentage would of 
course change in the event of a UK withdrawal as a member of the EU. Figure 2.9, 
which has been produced using data from the EU Commission, shows the percentage 









Figure 2.9 EEZ’s by EU member state and as a Proportion of the Total EU EEZ Including 
UK  
 
Source: (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2018) 
 
The Irish EEZ contains some of the richest fishing grounds in Europe which is clearly the 
reason that other EU member states fishing fleets carry out a significant amount of 
fishing in our EEZ. 
 
The Department of Agriculture, Food & the Marine (DAFM) in conjunction with the 
Marine Institute analyses data on landings from the Irish EEZ, but as fish landings are 












































EEZ’s by Member State and as a proportion 
of the total EU EEZ 
  incl UK 
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there is a considerable amount of analysis required to compile exact fish landing 
figures for the Irish EEZ.   
 
The Marine Institute, in looking at the landings (TAC species only) exclusively from the 
Irish EEZ, established that the average landings of all species from the Irish EEZ over the 
period 2011-2015 amounted to just under 387,000 tonnes with an approximate value 
of €444 million.  
 
The Marine Institute analysis also established that Irish registered sea-fishing boats 
accounted for 42% of those landings by weight with UK sea-fishing boats accounting 
for 16%, Dutch 15%, French 10% and Spanish 7%. 
 
Figure 2.10 Average Landings by EU member state from the Ireland’s EEZ  
 









Average Landings (tonnes) by MS from the 
Irish EEZ as a proportion of total landings 
from the Irish EEZ 
IRL 160,536 BEL 820 DEU 26,274 DNK 14,299
ESP 27,056 FRA 37,113 NLD 58,394 UK 62,381
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Looking at the value of landings, Ireland accounts for 36% of the average value of 
landings from the Irish EEZ followed by France (18%), the UK (16%), Spain (15%) and 
the Netherlands (8%). 
Figure 2.11 Value of fish landed from Ireland’s EEZ by EU member state  
 
Source: (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2018) 
 
So where does the Irish fishing fleet catch the remainder of TAC species? 
 
Analysis carried out by the Marine Institute shows that Irish fishing vessels catch a 
significant proportion of total catch in the UK EEZ (e.g. of the two most valuable Irish 
fisheries mackerel and nephrops (Dublin Bay Prawns) Ireland catches 60% of mackerel 
and 40% of nephrops in the UK EEZ. On average 34% of the landings by Irish sea-fishing 
boats over the years 2011 to 2015 were taken from UK waters and this trend has not 
changed in recent years. The Marine Institute estimates that Irish sea-fishing boats 
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Many other EU member states also fish in the UK EEZ. Figure 2.12 shows recorded fish 
landings by volume from the UK EEZ by member state as a proportion of overall 
landings from the UK EEZ  
 
Figure 2.12 Average Landings by EU member state from the UK EEZ  
 
Source: (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2018) 
 














Average Landings (tonnes) by MS from the 
UK EEZ as a proportion of total landings 
from the UK EEZ 
BEL  10 875 DEU 65 158 DNK 271 779 ESP 5 833 FRA 97 572
IRL 84 850 NLD 140 077 SWE 28 735 UK 512 557
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Figure 2.13 Value from the UK EEZ by each EU member state  
 
Source: (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2018) 
 
Irish vessels catch a small proportion of TAC in other EU member states EEZ but the 
bulk of the Irish TAC, for the forty commercial stocks that are of interest to the Irish 
fishing industry, are captured in the Irish and UK EEZs.  
 
Ireland has the majority of its fishing opportunities in ICES areas 6 and ICES area 7 
(covering Ireland’s EEZ as well as part of the UK & French EEZs). The fishing 
opportunities for 2017 for stocks to which the Irish fleet had access amounted to 1.3 
million tonnes of fish with a landing value of €1.44 billion (available to Ireland and 
other member states). Ireland’s total share of these fishing opportunities in 2017 
amounted to 234,493 tonnes with a value of €226 million (excluding valuable inshore 
fisheries such as Crab and Lobster, Whelk, Razor Clam, etc. which are not managed 
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Following consultation, the Council of Fisheries Ministers sets the Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) by species for each EU member state for the following year at the 
December meeting. The meeting is followed by an EU Regulation setting out, for each 
member state, the total tonnage of catch and the geographical area (ICES area) where 
the catch can be taken. It is the responsibility of each member state to manage their 
fisheries within these TACs. Ireland distributes the TAC by setting quotas for individual 
fishing vessels which may not be transferred, sold or leased to another fishing vessel. In 
many other member states quotas are owned and administered by the fishing industry, 
but in Ireland fish quota is a public resource and is managed by the Minister for 
Agriculture, Food & the Marine. The Minister decides on the management of fish 
quotas following consultation and, where possible, taking into account the views 
expressed by industry representatives. However, the Minister often has to make 
decisions in the national interest and often in the absence of a unanimously agreed 
industry position. Any unused quota is redistributed to other fishing vessels with a view 
to maximising the fishing opportunities available to the Irish fishing sector.    
   
Common Fisheries Policy Control & Enforcement 
 
The Sea-Fisheries Protection Authority (SFPA) is responsible for both sea-fisheries 
control and enforcement and consumer seafood safety in Ireland. Control and 
enforcement is a key pillar of the CFP and each member state is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with EU regulations by all fishing vessels operating within its EEZ. 
In Ireland, with an EEZ that is ten times as large as our land mass, control and 
enforcement can be challenging. At sea fisheries inspections within Ireland’s Exclusive 
Fisheries Zone (200 NM) are conducted by the Irish Naval Service working under a 
service level agreement with the SFPA. The SFPA is independent from the Minister and 
the Department of Agriculture, Food & the Marine and in accordance with the Sea 
Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 2006 (Government of Ireland, 2006), all 
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operational issues of sea fisheries control and enforcement are exclusively a matter for 
the Sea Fisheries Protection Authority (SFPA) and the Irish Naval Service. The Minister 
can set policy for the SFPA but is precluded from involvement in operational matters 
and fisheries control activities.  
 
The EU Control Regulation 1224/2009 (EU Common Fisheries Control Regulation, 2013) 
establishes a Community Control System for ensuring compliance with the rules of the 
CFP. The EU Commission has commenced a review of the policy and it is likely the 
review process will bring forward some changes to the policy. 
 
Fishery Harbour Centres 
 
Ireland has six designated Fishery Harbour Centres (FHCs), which are owned and 
operated by the Department of Agriculture, Food & the Marine. The FHCs specialise in 
facilitating fish landings and are located in Killybegs, Castletownbere, Dingle, Ros an 
Mhíl, Howth and Dunmore East. Users of the FHCs are charged for the use of the 
facilities and any income from the Harbours is held in the Fisheries Harbour Centre 
Fund. This fund, which is ring-fenced under statute, pays for the day-to-day operational 
running costs in the Fishery Harbour Centres but the level of charges levied is not 
adequate to support the significant capital infrastructure development costs in the 




Key statistics provide a snapshot of the Irish seafood sector. It is important to 
understand how the Irish fishing fleet is structured and how the measurement of the 
Irish fishing fleet feeds into the EU wide mechanism for capping EU fishing effort to 
avoid overexploiting fish stocks. The Irish EEZ out to 200 NM is EU water and the entire 
area is mapped in ICES rectangles that are used as functional units to return scientific 
advice and manage fish stocks when setting TACs. Fleet segmentation is a domestic 
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tool to differentiate categories of fishing vessels and provide a structure to distribute 
Ireland’s TAC to fishing vessels in a fair manner using the quota system. Robust control 
and enforcement measures are essential to promote compliance and ensure the CFP is 
embraced by all fishing vessels operating in our EEZ. Seafood is a significant employer 
in Ireland and seafood trade is important to the coastal economy in Ireland and the 
lifeblood of coastal communities. Ireland has world class fish landing infrastructure for 
use by Irish and non-Irish fishing vessels. In terms of international trade, the UK is a 
significant seafood trading partner for Ireland and the outline of the seafood sector 
presented in this chapter sets context for some of the issues that will inevitably unfold 
in the context of Brexit. In the next chapter, Brexit and some of the potential impacts 








On the 29th March 2017, the UK Government notified the European Union that it was 
invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (European Union, 2009). The 
decision to invoke Article 50 followed from the 52% majority decision in the 23rd June 
2016 UK referendum to leave the EU. The process of the UK quitting the EU had 
become nicknamed BREXIT (with the name being attributed, by the Oxford English 
Dictionary, to Peter Wilding). Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (European 
Union , 1993) enacted by the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2009) gives any EU 
member state the right to quit the EU unilaterally. On 1st February 2017, the UK passed 
the European Union Bill (UK Government, 2017) which sets a two year timetable for 
the UK to officially leave the EU. That date was set to be 29th March 2019.  
 
It was anticipated that in the intervening two year period a withdrawal agreement 
would be reached between the UK and the EU. At the time it was thought that the 
Article 50 notification could not be stopped or reversed but further clarifications and 
events have proved this not to be the case. Following formal notification, the EU and 
the UK entered into negotiations on reaching a withdrawal agreement.  
 
It was also anticipated the agreement would be in place prior to the proposed Brexit 
date on the 29th March 2019. The EU and UK provisionally agreed there would be a 
transition period from 30th March 2019 to 31 December 2020 during which the UK 
would continue to be bound by EU law and the status quo would prevail as if the UK 
was still a member state. During that period the future relationship between the EU 
and the UK on all matters, including fisheries, would be negotiated. In the case of 
fisheries it was agreed that the UK would continue to fully comply with the CFP for the 




Under the CFP, TACs are set on a calendar year basis and the UK would be bound by 
the TACs up until the end of 2020. In addition during the transition arrangements 
access arrangements for fishing grounds would remain unaltered and future access 
arrangements would be negotiated as part of the future relationship negotiations.  
 
During negotiation on the withdrawal agreement it became apparent that difficulties 
were arising in the process. A particular sticking point was the commitment that the UK 
Government had given to avoid reinstating a hard border on the island of Ireland, 
known as the Backstop arrangement (an element in the negotiated, but unratified, 
EU/UK withdrawal agreement that would keep Northern Ireland in the customs union 
and single market until a solution is found to prevent a hard border on the island of 
Ireland). Relations between the UK and Ireland deteriorated in an environment where 
the EU was supporting the position of protecting the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and 
avoiding the reinstatement of a hard border in Ireland. The main reason for the 
dramatic deterioration in relations was that the Irish border had become the primary 
obstacle to the UK completing a successful Article 50 withdrawal agreement with the 
EU (O'Brennan, 2019). The British government and Brexiteers have refashioned the 
border problem as one of EU and Irish making (Murphy, 2019). In the intervening 
period a general election in the UK had led to a government being formed by the 
Conservative Party but dependent on the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP – a unionist 
political party in Northern Ireland with a strong British Identity and supportive of 
Northern Ireland remaining in the UK which was founded by Rev Ian Paisley in 1971). 
The DUP currently has 10 of the 650 British House of Commons seats (UK Parliament, 
2019) and supports the minority Conservative Party government through a Confidence 
and Supply arrangement. One of the suggested solutions to satisfy the Backstop 
arrangement was for Northern Ireland to remain in the EU customs union. However, 
the DUP was not willing to have Northern Ireland treated any differently to the rest of 




Prime Minister Theresa May’s attempts to have the agreement she had reached with 
the EU ratified by the House of Commons failed and the prospect of the UK leaving the 
European Union without a deal (crash-out Brexit) became more of a concern. On 20th 
March 2019, the UK requested an extension to Article 50 to 30th June 2019. On 21st 
March 2019, the EU agreed to grant an extension up to 12th April 2019, should the 
Withdrawal Agreement not be approved by the House of Commons or up to 22nd May 
2019 should the Withdrawal Agreement be approved by the House of Commons. 
 
Brexit risk mitigation plans were progressed in every Irish Government Department. 
The risk of a crash-out Brexit was postponed with an application by the UK 
Government to the EU on 2nd April 2019 for a further extension of the Article 50 
withdrawal agreement period. The EU responded on 10th April 2019 with an agreement 
to extend the deadline up to 31st October 2019 with the possibility that if the House of 
Commons ratified the Withdrawal Agreement before the revised deadline, then the UK 
would be able to leave the EU earlier. The revised Brexit date afforded the EU, and 
particularly Ireland, an opportunity to hone Brexit crash-out contingency plans while 
still maintaining a desire that a negotiated withdrawal agreement would be agreed.  
 
The UK Fishing Industry    
 
In 2014 the UK fishing industry employed 11,845 fishermen and fisherwomen (Marine 
Management Organisation, 2015)and was worth £426 million to UK Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (House of Commons Library, 2016). This amounted to less than 0.5% of 
UK GDP (New Economics Foundation, 2016). 
 
Fisheries have a much broader cultural, social and historic value in the UK and fisheries 
are of vital importance to the many coastal communities that depend on fisheries and 
aquaculture as their main industry. UK Fisheries was a prominent topic in the Brexit 
referendum campaign. On 15th June 2016 Nigel Farage boarded a flotilla of fishing 
boats on the Thames in London and traded insults on the water with Sir Bob Geldof 
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who was pointing out the folly of Brexit. Mr. Farage’s strapline on the day was “take 
back control of British waters”. This was a recurring theme from pro-Brexit supporters 
and UK fishing industry representatives including Mr. Bertie Armstrong (Scottish 
Fishermen’s Federation). Given the relative low value of fisheries to the overall UK 
economy, leaders in the UK fishing industry feared their industry would be gazumped 
in negotiations in favour of more strategically and economically important goals and 
that fear has continued throughout the withdrawal negotiation process (See Figure 3.1) 
despite reassurances from the UK Government. 
 
Figure 3.1 Photo of ‘Fishing for Leave’ Banner  
Source: Robin Millard-AFP-Getty Images (The Guardian, 2019) 
Fisheries in the UK are managed on a devolved basis by the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, although many of the overarching policy 
decisions continue to be made centrally in London. The profile of the fishing industry 
differs significantly between the administrative areas in Scotland, Wales, England and 
Northern Ireland. For example, the Scottish fishing fleet has relatively fewer, but 
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generally larger, vessels but these vessels land the most fish (in terms of both volume 
and value) (Fergus Ewing MSP, 2016) while England, Wales and Northern Ireland have 
more fishermen and fisherwomen and more fishing vessels, but land less volume than 
Scotland (Ares, 2019). 
Fish stocks have to be proactively managed to ensure sustainability and the majority of 
the main species fished commercially by UK fleets (e.g. mackerel, herring, haddock, 
cod, and plaice) are highly mobile (Stewart, 2016). Connelly (2018) asks the question 
“Is there such a thing as a British fish?” But, of course, fish know nothing of political 
borders and many species move freely between national territorial waters throughout 
their life cycles (UK Parliament, 2016). Fish do not respect political borders and are free 
to move between the EEZs of sovereign states. If the UK leaves the EU, and the CFP no 
longer applies, proper management of fish stocks will continue to be necessary. The UK 
will continue to have obligations under the United National Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) (United Nations, 1982) to manage stocks sustainably, on the basis of 
scientific advice, and to arrange access for neighbouring states to surplus stocks. 
Furthermore, under UNCLOS there is an obligation to prevent Illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing. In addition the EU currently is a member of the North East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) on behalf of all EU member states. This 
organisation deals, inter alia, with management of migratory fish stocks in the North 
East Atlantic. Post-Brexit the UK will have to join this organisation as a third country 
(the application for membership cannot be made while the UK is an EU member state). 
In a post-Brexit scenario the UK will be obliged to fulfil its obligations under 
international fisheries laws as a third country. This will inevitably necessitate co-
operative management of stocks that are shared by two or more countries. 
 
Many UK fishermen believe the EU CFP has not always been successful in achieving the 
objectives of managing a mobile and renewable resource sustainably and that the 
application of EU-adopted technical measures is unfair on the UK. It is ironic then that 
the UK fishing industry claim credit for recent reform of the CFP and initiatives 
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including the move towards regional management, maximum sustainable yield and the 
banning of discards. Highlighting the issues around the discarding of fish can indeed, in 
the first instance, be attributed to a UK citizen, celebrity chef Hugh Fearnley-
Whittingstall who recruited other celebrities (including Jamie Oliver), to influence the 
politicians and demand an end to the practice of discarding (throwing overboard at 
sea) fish that were already dead in the fishing nets but for which the fishing vessel did 
not have adequate quota. 
 
A UK withdrawal from the European Union will mean a UK withdrawal from the CFP. 
Some among the UK fishing industry believe that withdrawing from the CFP will give 
the UK the opportunity to develop a better fisheries management regime that is 
tailored to the conditions of UK waters and its fleet. It is interesting to note that 
Stewart (2016) is at variance with this view and his analysis concludes that the UK’s 
continued membership of the EU would likely be the best long-term option for UK 
fisheries. Carpenter (2016) whose research focuses on the environmental, social, and 
economic impacts of transitioning to sustainable management of natural resources is 
of the view that the CFP has helped, not harmed, UK fisheries. A Fernandes (2015) fact 
check shows that in 2015, the UK was allocated 30% of the EU quota for fishing ground 
stocks which occur in UK waters. The UK Government believes that, once outside the 
EU, it will be able to renegotiate its TACs for stocks that are shared with the EU and 
other neighbouring countries. The UK Government also believes that, once outside the 
EU, the UK can represent its own interests at international fisheries negotiations with 
neighbouring states and that, post-Brexit, the UK will be able to control access by 
foreign vessels to UK waters. It is likely that the UK will attempt to use access 
arrangements as a bargaining chip to negotiate new allocations of TACs for the 
sustainable exploitation of shared stocks. However, fish stock management is a 
complicated business which becomes even more complicated in an international 
context. For example, species of fish may spend different stages of their life cycles in 
different EEZs, their spawning grounds may be in a different region from where they 
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are mature. In addition, mature fish may be more valuable to catch at a particular point 
in their lifecycle and accordingly it may be more beneficial to catch them in a 
neighbouring EEZ rather than one’s own EEZ. From a practical point of view, the UK 
fishing fleet is comparatively small both in terms of number of vessels and size of 
vessels. Accordingly, if the UK was to exclude EU fishing vessels, the UK fishing fleet 
would need to expand significantly to fully avail of the fishing opportunities freed up by 
the exit of EU vessels from UK fishing grounds. Such an expansion would require major 
capital investment and, even if adequate funding was available, would likely take a 
number of years to achieve. 
 
Seafish (Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) set up to support the UK seafood 
industry) values the UK seafood industry at £10b. In the year to August 2017, the total 
landings by UK fishing vessels was 701,000 tonnes while seafood exports from the UK 
in the same period were 446,500 tonnes (Seafish, 2018). 68% by value and 53% by 
volume of the seafood consumed in the UK in the year ending August 2017 was 
imported (Seafish, 2018). The large EU market for seafood is important to the UK but 
equally the UK market is important for EU countries, not least Ireland. Continued 
access to tariff-free trade is important to the UK seafood industry and seafood 
consumers. While the UK negotiators have made efforts to separate fisheries from the 
wider trade negotiations, the EU negotiators have not, to date, acceded to these 
efforts. Ireland remains strong among the EU member states that support the 
continued linkage of fisheries and other trade aspects.  
 
Divorcing UK fisheries from the EU will be challenging. Following UK withdrawal from 
the EU, the UK will have to implement arrangements with the EU and other third 
countries to manage shared fish stocks and appropriate access arrangements for 
fishing vessels into each other’s EEZs in addition to a suitable seafood trade deal. This 




Despite the rhetoric around UK fisheries during the Brexit referendum campaign, it has 
subsequently become clear to many in the fishing industry that Brexit presents 
particular issues for the UK fishing industry that are not easily solved. 
 
Negotiating a Withdrawal Agreement  
  
Many in the Irish fishing industry have an underlying belief they were abandoned by 
the Irish EEC accession negotiators in the early 1970s. However, critics who held that 
accession would amount to the sale of the national birth-right for a mess of common 
agricultural pottage, and that the jewel of Irish sovereignty was a pearl of too great a 
price to be bartered for the flesh pots of Brussels, were bluntly told that Ireland could 
not lose what it had not got (Lee, 1989).  In the context of Brexit, and a now more 
developed Irish fishing industry with much to lose, perhaps there is more reason to 
fear being jettisoned in favour of some of the bigger issues to be considered in 
negotiating a withdrawal agreement. One of the larger Irish fisheries Producer 
Organisations, the Killybegs Fisherman’s Organisation (KFO), joined with EU sister 
organisations from Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Sweden and 
the Netherlands (18,000 fishermen and 3,500 fishing vessels with a combined annual 
turnover of €20.7 billion) in the European Fisheries Alliance (EUFA) (European Fisheries 
Alliance, 2019) to promote a united front of European fishermen in the face of Brexit 
negotiations.  
 
As part of the negotiated withdrawal agreement, a transition period from 29th March 
2019 to 31st December 2020 was included in the draft agreement. For fisheries, the 
transition period would mean relative stability could be maintained, protecting 
sustainability of fish stocks would continue and access to waters would remain 
unchanged for the period. The transition period would enable EU and UK fishermen to 
maintain economic competitiveness and underpin existing business models until the 
end of 2020, allowing scope to negotiate a post-Brexit deal for fisheries.   
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However, the draft withdrawal agreement would have to, in the first instance, be 
ratified by the UK Houses of Parliament and then by the parliaments of all remaining 27 
EU member states. Former Prime Minister Theresa May’s successive attempts to steer 
the UK out of the EU were met with both internal and cross-party contestation and 
deepening public frustration (Murphy, forthcoming 2019). In a series of votes in the 
House of Commons she failed to gain the votes required as the 29th March 2019 drew 
close. At that point a number of scenarios seemed possible: 
 The deal would be ratified by UK and EU27 parliaments and the transition 
period would commence. 
 The deal would be renegotiated and a new deal would be ratified by UK and 
EU27 parliaments and the transition period would commence. 
 The UK would “crash-out” of the EU without an agreed deal and become a 
third country with immediate effect. 
 The UK would withdraw the Article 50 notice and remain an EU member 
state (this may require a fresh referendum, a general election or both). 
 The UK would seek, and the EU would accede to extend the Article 50 
notice period beyond 29th March 2019.  
 
In the event, as we now know, the UK applied for an extension and the EU acceded to, 
what became known as the flextension up until 31st October 2019. The above scenarios 
remain possible at the time of writing. While, at this time, a crash out seems less likely 
following the passage of the Benn Bill it cannot be discounted given Boris Johnson’s 
stated position.  
 
North – South Relations 
 
Murphy (2018b) outlines Brexit in the context of Northern Ireland and explores the 
complicated relationship between Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom, the 
European Union and Ireland. In any Brexit situation it is likely that fisheries-related 
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issues, and particularly access to waters and cross-border trade, will further test that 
complicated relationship. 
 
The Voisinage Arrangements, which were the subject of an exchange of letters 
between officials in Northern Ireland and Ireland in the 1960s, are long-standing 
reciprocal arrangements which allow fishing boats from Northern Ireland access to fish 
within the 0 to 6 NM zone of the territorial waters of the Irish State and vice versa. The 
Voisinage Arrangements have operated under the auspices of the London Fisheries 
Convention since at least 1965 and have operated to allow reciprocal access to 
territorial waters for all species of fish.  
 
The London Convention which culminated in Treaty Series 1966 No.1 (London Fisheries 
Convention, 1964) allowed that each Coastal State could assert exclusive fishing rights 
within 6 NM from its baselines (Article 2) but also provided for Voisinage or 
neighbourhood arrangements (Article 9) for contracting parties to allow those 
fishermen from another coastal state who had habitually fished within that belt to 
continue to do so.  The Convention also grants rights to neighbouring countries to fish 
in each other's 6 to 12 NM fishing zones based on historic fishing activity.  The extent 
of the application of the London Fisheries Convention is limited to 12 NM. On the basis 
of the Convention, an exchange of letters in the 1960s between the UK/Northern 
Ireland and Ireland allowed for vessels from Northern Ireland to continue to fish within 
Ireland’s 6 NM zone and vice versa. 
 
However, High Court judgment in Barlow & Ors v. Minister for Agriculture, Food and 
Marine & Ors (High Court of Ireland Decisions, 2014) taken against the State by four 
mussel seed fishermen and subsequently a Supreme Court judgment in Barlow & Ors v. 
Minister for Agriculture, Food and Marine & Ors (Supreme Court of Ireland Decisions, 
2016) found that fishing by Northern Ireland vessels within the 0 to 6 NM zone of the 
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territorial waters of the State under the Voisinage arrangements was not provided for 
in domestic law.  
 
Notably, both Justice Bermingham in the High Court and Justice O’ Donnell in the 
Supreme Court opine that these letters are evidence of a pre-existing arrangement 
between the jurisdictions. Justice Birmingham finds that the Government’s 
maintenance of this ‘informal attitude’ is evidence that “the all-Ireland dimension to 
fishing is long established and at this stage deeply entrenched”.   
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court upheld the High Court finding that the 
Voisinage arrangements were not invalid but that, as it stood, there was insufficient 
provision in domestic law for them. The Supreme Court in fact noted that the 
arrangements were a sensible recognition at official level of practice and tradition, 
where fishing boats traditionally fished neighbouring waters. 
 
To remedy the situation, the Irish Government approved the publication of the Sea-
Fisheries (Amendment) Bill to address the issues raised by the Supreme Court 
judgment of 27 October 2016, and the Bill was published on 13 February 2017.   
 
While the Bill proposed to restore access to Northern Ireland boats to fish, under the 
terms of the Voisinage arrangements, this access would be subject to the same 
conditions that apply to Irish sea-fishing boats. The Bill itself did not apply the specific 
conditions. The objective was that the appropriate measures would come into effect at 
the same time as commencement order for the Bill. Together, the Bill and the 
associated measures would re-establish the status quo for fishing access that existed 
under the Voisinage arrangements before the Supreme Court's judgment on 27 
October 2016. The only difference would be that the Voisinage arrangements would be 
provided for within a legislative framework. The access arrangements for Northern 
Ireland boats would not change as a result of the Bill, Northern Ireland boats would 
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simply regain fishing access they had previously enjoyed for decades under the 
Voisinage arrangements in the 0-6 NM zone of the territorial waters of the State. They 
would also continue to be subject to the same measures that apply to Irish-registered 
fishing boats. 
 
While the CFP allows for the continuation of existing neighbourhood arrangements, it 
does not cater for the creation of new arrangements. On departure from the EU, 
access to fisheries in UK waters as a third country would be a matter for the EU to 
negotiate on Ireland’s behalf. To guarantee EU recognition of the Voisinage 
arrangements, it was important for the arrangements to be operational at the time of 
Brexit. In such circumstances, it is likely that the EU would recognise the arrangements 
as pre-existing and bilateral.  However, if the Bill had not completed the legislative 
process before the UK departure it would most likely have been within the EU’s 
competence to consider whether or not to agree the arrangements as part of a future 
relationship with the UK. 
 
Fishing industry representatives and the opposition parties were briefed on the Bill and 
the associated measures. However, the Bill met with strong opposition when the 
Minister for Agriculture, Food & the Marine introduced it into Seanad Éireann in 
February 2017.  Those who opposed the Bill (including some fishing Industry 
representative organisations and opposition politicians who had been subjected to 
very effective lobbying by a small minority of fishermen), expressed a view that in the 
context of the uncertainty facing the Irish fishing industry with Brexit looming, the 
Voisinage Arrangements should not be restored by Ireland but rather used as a 
bargaining chip in any Brexit negotiations. To make matters more complicated the then 
UK Environment Secretary Michael Gove, wishing to close all access for non-UK fishing 
vessels to UK waters (if required) announced on 2nd July 2017 that the United Kingdom 
had decided to trigger its withdrawal from the 1964 London Fisheries Convention. 
There were no immediate implications for the Irish fishing fleet as the withdrawal 
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process from the London Fisheries Convention takes two years. In any case the access 
arrangements had been restated in Annex 1 of the CFP Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 
1380/2013 of the European Parliament, 2013) (with the exception of the zone around 
Northern Ireland which is catered for by UK domestic legislation only) and so would 
remain in force while the UK remained an EU member state but access will cease if the 
UK leaves the EU and is no longer bound by the CFP. Under current arrangements, the 
Irish fishing fleet has access to parts of the UK 6-12 NM zone, as has the UK fleet to 
parts of the Irish 6-12 NM zone. The London Fisheries Convention deals primarily with 
the 6-12 NM zone, and the Irish fleet is not significantly dependent on this access as 
Irish fishing effort in the UK 6-12 NM zone is low other than small amounts of Haddock 
in the 6-12 NM zone north of Co Derry (Cape grounds) where there is also a very small 
Scallop fishery.   
 
Since announcing departure from the convention, the UK has also stated it wishes to 
maintain the Voisinage arrangements with Ireland and that the UK Government 
remains committed to the principles behind the Voisinage Arrangement and to 
protecting and supporting continued cooperation between Northern Ireland and 
Ireland. The UK also noted that they had continued to honour the agreement by 
allowing Irish fishing vessels continued access to the Northern Irish 0-6 NM zone but 
stated that situation could not be continued indefinitely if access to the Irish 0-6 NM 
zone was not restored for Northern Irish fishing vessels (UK Parliament, 2018). 
 
In light of strong cross-party opposition the Bill failed to make any progress in Seanad 
Éireann between 2016 and 2019. Then on 26th February 2019 two Northern Irish-
registered fishing boats (The Amity and The Boy Joseph) were arrested by the Irish 
Naval Service for fishing illegally in Dundalk Bay. The arrests highlighted the unequable 
legal situation where Northern Irish fishing vessels could not fish in the Irish 0-6 NM 
zone. Some Northern Ireland fishing industry representatives levied an accusation that 
Ireland was strongly opposing a hard border on the island of Ireland by insisting on the 
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Backstop arrangement in Brexit negotiations while, at the same time, creating a hard 
border in the sea by preventing Northern Irish fishing boats accessing the Southern 
Irish 0 to 6 NM zone and arresting any fishing vessels that accessed that zone. This was 
a significant development in the context of Brexit, but it was particularly significant as 
it occurred at a delicate point in the EU/ UK Brexit negotiation process with Theresa 
May attempting to win the support of the Democratic Unionist Party to carry her 
withdrawal agreement in the House of Commons. Taoiseach Leo Varadkar issued a 
statement that appropriate legislation to restore the reciprocal access (previously 
enjoyed by fishermen north and south to each other’s 0-6 NM zones) would be put on 
the Irish statute books.  With cross-party support (the Bill was opposed by some 
independent TDs) the Bill passed all stages in Seanad Éireann and Dáil Éireann and the 
Sea-Fisheries (Amendment) Act 2019 was commenced by the Minister for Agriculture, 
Food and the Marine on 23rd April 2019. 
 
The Act provides for legislative amendments to the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime 
Jurisdiction Act 2006 (Government of Ireland, 2006) in order to address the Supreme 
Court October 2016 finding. The passage of and commencement of the Act provides 
legal clarity which was found wanting by the Irish Supreme Court.   
 
The restoration of the Voisinage Arrangements by the enactment of the Sea-Fisheries 
(Amendment) Act 2019 was important for north/south relations in the context of the 
sensitive political climate in Northern Ireland and a recognition that good relations will 
have to be re-established once the dust settles on Brexit. Regular Anglo-Irish elite 
contact at the European level has in difficult times helped to maintain positive all-
island relations (Harris, 2001). Post-Brexit these contacts are likely to be less available.  
Brexit has damaged British-Irish relations and that damage will take some considerable 
time to repair. It will require strong political leadership, mutual respect, and a shared 




Disputed Fishing Grounds 
 
Access to fishing grounds will be significant in the context of Brexit, however in 
advance of Brexit some fishing grounds are already disputed. One such dispute arises 
in relation to Rockall. Rockall is an uninhabited granite rock in the North Atlantic which 
lies within the EEZ of the UK and is claimed by the UK as a part of Scotland. As Rockall 
cannot sustain human life, it cannot have an attendant EEZ. However, the Scottish 
Government has claimed the establishment of a 12 NM territorial sea around Rockall. 
Ireland recognises that Rockall is in the UK EEZ but does not accept that a 12 NM 
territorial sea can be unilaterally declared around Rockall by the Scottish Government. 
The Irish position is that Rockall is currently in European waters while the UK is an EU 
member state with all authorised EU vessels entitled to fish in the area of the rock. The 
issue of access for EU fishing vessels within 12 NM of Rockall was first raised in 2017 
following the Brexit referendum. It now appears that in a pre-emptive Brexit measure 
Scotland is attempting to assert sovereignty of Rockall. 
 
Rockall is significant in a fisheries context as its surrounding waters have traditionally 
provided good fishing grounds for species such as Haddock and Squid. For decades the 
Irish fishing fleet has prosecuted fisheries within the now disputed 12 NM zone of 
Rockall. In a press statement issued jointly by the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine on 7th June 2019 
(Minister for Foreign Affairs & Trade and Minister for Agriculture, Food & the Marine, 
2019) it was revealed  that a formal letter of notice had been received from the 
Scottish Cabinet Secretary for External Affairs, Fiona Hyslop MSP, stating that Scotland 
would deploy vessels in the Rockall area to take enforcement action against Irish 
vessels found fishing within 12 miles of Rockall from 7th June 2019 onwards. At the 
time of writing, Irish fishing vessels are continuing to fish the waters around Rockall 
with no arrests made to date. However, it can be anticipated that Rockall will become 
an issue again in the Brexit process in the context of a negotiated withdrawal, or 




This is just one example of the complexities that Brexit and, in particular a hard Brexit, 
is likely to raise in the short-to-medium timeframe. Despite the negotiation of a 
withdrawal agreement, the House of Commons has failed to ratify it. While Boris 
Johnson appears to be purposefully steering directly into a crash-out/hard Brexit, 
opposition MPs and some rebel Tory MP’s are attempting to prevent it. The successful 
passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 in the UK Parliament 
forces Boris Johnson to apply to the EU for an extension if a deal cannot be agreed by 
19th October 2019. However, Johnson has said he will not apply for an extension. So, if 
it was to happen, what does a hard Brexit mean for the Irish fishing industry?      
 




A hard Brexit, if it were to occur, would present all sectors in Ireland with immediate 
difficulties. In the case of the seafood sector, some of the particular difficulties would 
include: 
 Loss of access to UK waters for Irish sea-fishing vessels. 
 Displacement from UK waters to Irish waters of sea-fishing vessels from other 
EU member states. 
 Potential conflict between sea-fishing vessels on the fishing grounds. 
 Seafood trade issues. 
 Access to market issues. 
 
Each of these potential consequences for the seafood sector in the event of a hard 
Brexit is explored in the following sections. The analysis that follows draws on reports 




Loss of Access 
 
A hard Brexit would likely lead to an immediate loss of access for Irish fishing vessels to 
the UK zone. As it stands 34% (by weight) of total fish landed by Irish fishing vessels is 
caught in the UK EEZ. For some of the most important stocks of mackerel and nephrops 
(Dublin Bay Prawns) the outtake, by weight, from the UK EEZ is 64% and 42% 
respectively. The value lost to Irish fishing boats if they were excluded from the UK EEZ 
is estimated at €83.8m or almost 50% of the total value of Irish quota for these two 
species. 
 
While 58% of all landings from the UK Zone are taken by non-UK vessels, the UK takes 
less than 20% of all its landings from outside the UK Zone (including Norwegian 
waters). In balancing this equation, the inevitable conclusion is that the UK is much less 
dependent on access to EU waters than vice versa. 
 
UK Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
Figure 3.2 UK EEZ, EU EEZ, Third Country EEZ  
    





In a crash-out Brexit there is a likelihood that the UK would exclude all non-UK fishing 
vessels from UK waters. In this scenario, all the Irish fishing fleet and the rest of the EU 
fishing fleet would be restricted inside the remaining EU waters. Ireland’s 200 mile 
zone would then be a significant and attractive portion of the available EU fishing 
grounds and this would likely lead to a large influx of EU27 fishing vessels. As fishing 
vessels would not have other suitable fishing grounds in which they could target the 
TACs they had been allocated a transfer of fishing activity from the UK zone to the Irish 
fishing zone by the fishing fleets of France, Belgium, Spain, Germany and the 
Netherlands would likely occur. The annual TAC would, of course, have been decided at 
the previous December Fisheries Council of Ministers based on the scientific advice 
available at that time for the European seas – not the reduced area of EU maritime 
territory post-Brexit. The increased fishing activity in the Irish EEZ would likely lead to 
serious over-exploitation of fish stocks in the Irish zone. The fisheries science would lag 
any overfishing and it is likely irreparable damage to stocks would occur. This would 
undermine one of the key CFP principles of managing fish stocks and preventing fishing 
beyond maximum sustainable yield. In years to follow, remedial action would likely 
lead to substantial cuts in TACs for Irish waters which could potentially tip some Irish 
fishing vessels beyond the delicate balance of economic viability.  
 
An example is as follows: France currently catches large proportions of its whitefish 
TAC in the UK zone of the Celtic Sea. If France was locked out of the UK zone a 
considerable shift into the Irish zone of the Celtic Sea would, for many, be their only 
option. This could increase fishing effort in the Irish zone leading to considerable 






Conflict on the Fishing Grounds    
 
Following from the likely influx of vessels into the Irish EEZ and the risk of overfishing, 
there is a definite risk that Irish fishermen will attempt to underpin the sustainability of 
fish stocks in the Irish EEZ by entering into conflict at sea with fishing vessels from 
other EU member states fishing, legally, within the Irish EEZ. History presents us with 
examples of conflict at sea from the past e.g. the Icelandic cod wars (which concluded 
in 1976) and the more recent, August 2018, conflict between UK and French fishing 
boats off the coast of Normandy coast when French fishing boats prevented the UK 
fishing boats from fishing for Scallop in the Bay of Seine (see Fig 3.3). Scallop fishing in 
the Bay of Seine had been closed to the French fishermen at the time for conservation 
purposes but the closure did not extend to the UK Fishing boats which were entitled to 
target Scallop there. Emotions often run high on the fishing grounds and the risk of 
physical conflict in these circumstances cannot be ruled out. 
 
Figure 3.3 Photo of French & UK Fishing Vessels Jostling in Bay of Seine  
 
Source: Scallop war: French and British boats clash in Channel (BBC News, 2018) 
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Trade Restrictions and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade with the EU27 
 
Ireland’s trade in seafood with the UK is significant and a hard Brexit is likely to have a 
serious effect on that trade. In the case of seafood imports 65% of Irish imports, in 
value, come from the UK (41.7% by volume). Ireland is the second largest of the UK’s 
EU markets by value and third by volume. Much of the seafood that Ireland imports 
from the UK originates in third countries and is shipped through the UK to Ireland. 
Alternative sources and/or routes for seafood imports to Ireland could of course be 
found and in such circumstances a reduction in the value of seafood imports from the 
UK in the first post-Brexit year would be expected. 
 
Access to Market 
 
Much of Ireland’s exports to other EU member states are transported via land bridge 
through the UK as it is currently the fastest and most economical route to mainland 
European markets. Seafood is a highly perishable product and a timely route to market 
is of vital importance. In the event of a hard Brexit and the UK becoming a third 
country and exiting the customs union, an obligation to implement additional 
import/export controls and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) checks immediately 
occurs. In addition, for seafood imports/exports national authorities are required to 
certify consignments as compliant with Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) 
fishing regulations. There is a risk that the additional border controls required could 
lead to significant delays for Irish exports using the land bridge route to the UK and in 
the case of seafood such delays could compromise the product. The SFPA has 
estimated that following a hard Brexit additional seafood export certifications could 







Figure 3.4 Seafood Trade Routes  
 
Source: Sea Fisheries Protection Authority (SFPA)            
 
European Commission Co-ordination to a Crash-out Brexit - Fisheries  
 
On 10th April 2019 the European Commission published a document setting out the 
European Union’s coordinated approach to fishing activities in case of a withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the Union without a deal (European Commission, 2019). This 
was one of a number of sectoral documents issued by the European Commission at 
that time. The document recognises the foregoing problems and sets out some 
mitigation measures.    
 
Access to UK Waters  
 
The EU Commission recognises that after a hard Brexit access to UK waters will be 
governed by UK legislation in accordance with international law and in particular 
UNCLOS. In advance of the 29th March 2019 Brexit deadline, the EU Commission 
offered a position of continuing to allow access for UK fishing vessels in EU waters up 
until 31st December 2019 on the basis that access for EU fishing vessels to UK waters is 
reciprocated by the UK. The contingent Regulation provides the legal framework for 
this measure which allows for the continuation of fishing operations with the least 
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disruption possible up until 31 December 2019. The EU Commission has indicated a 
willingness to extend the measure up until 31st December 2020. This measure is 
subject to EU/UK agreed arrangements which, at this point in time, seem unlikely in 
the harsh world of a hard Brexit.   
 
Displacement from UK Waters and Potential Conflict Between Sea-fishing 
Vessels on the Fishing Grounds 
 
In the event that access to each other’s waters did not prove possible and keeping in 
mind the possible impacts outlined above, it is clear that other mitigation measures 
would be necessary. In preparation, the EU Commission made amendments to the 
EMFF regulation to allow member states to implement compensation measures for 
temporary tie-up of their fishing vessels. This measure could be used as a 
complementary measure to other tools already available within the EMFF. With 
prudent use of these tools, protection from the risk of irreversibly depleting fish stocks 
could be mitigated. In addition, the principles enshrined in the CFP would be preserved 
and the risk of conflict at sea on overcrowded fishing grounds would be greatly 
reduced. 
 
This would also require a high level of coordination between member states as, for 
example, if one member state supported part of its fishing fleet to tie-up for a period 
and temporarily cease fishing on a particular fishing stock only to find that another 
member state prosecutes that stock in that particular area with the same (or higher) 
fishing effort, the potential benefits from the temporary tie-up scheme would not be 
achieved and indeed the potential for conflict between those tied-up and those fishing 
would increase. The EU Commission, in its paper, outlines its role as coordinator 
between member states for mitigation measures and to ensure a level playing field for 
EU fishermen. The EU Commission has not yet identified any additional funding for this 
measure and a number of member states have expressed a view that diverting funds 
already allocated for other purposes within the EMFF programme could not be made 
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available for a tie-up scheme. It is likely, therefore, that an EU Brexit mitigation 
package will have to be established to fund such initiatives.  
 
Seafood Trade and Access to Market 
 
The EU Commission paper is silent on issues associated with Seafood trade and access 
to market as these issues are best dealt with under the terms associated with all other 




The UK parliament has, to date, failed to ratify the withdrawal agreement negotiated 
between the EU and the UK. That agreement allowed for the continuation of the status 
quo for fisheries and seafood trade for a two year period while permanent 
arrangements are being negotiated. A poll conducted by a team from the University of 
Aberdeen led by Dr Craig McAngus found that 92% of those involved in the UK fishing 
industry voted to leave the EU. The principal reasons cited were concerns about the 
CFP, and a belief of significant benefit for the UK seafood sector outside of the CFP in a 
post-Brexit UK. However, the post-Brexit arrangements are yet to be negotiated and it 
remains to be seen if those arrangements will be more favourable for the UK fishing 
industry. In the meantime, east/west British-Irish and north/south relations on the 
island of Ireland remain strained. The exclusion of Northern Irish fishing vessels from 
the Irish 0-6 NM zone (as a result of an Irish Supreme Court judgment) and the 
subsequent arrest of two Northern Irish fishing vessels in the South added fuel to a 
political fire. This resulted in the Irish Government moving quickly to restore the 
reciprocal Voisinage Arrangements for Northern Irish fishing vessels. Other disputed 
fishing grounds, including the surrounds of Rockall, have also been brought to the fore 




Despite the extension to Article 50 withdrawal until 31st October 2019, the risk of a 
hard Brexit has increased and the consequences of that type of Brexit for the Irish 
seafood sector have been brought into sharp focus nationally and within the EU 
institutions. The EU Commission published a document on 10th April 2019 setting out 
an EU coordinated approach to fishing activities in case of a hard Brexit. The 
consequences of a hard Brexit are significant for the Irish seafood sector and it is now 
clear that Brexit is the biggest threat the seafood sector has ever faced.  
 
Following Theresa May’s failure to obtain agreement in the House of Commons for the 
withdrawal agreement, she resigned as Conservative Party leader and prime minister 
on 7th June 2019 leaving the way open for a leadership contest in the Conservative 
Party. On 24th July 2019 Boris Johnson succeeded Theresa May and immediately 
hardened the rhetoric around Brexit. Johnson called for a renegotiation of the 
Northern Ireland Backstop and committed to a UK exit on the 31st October 2019, either 
with or without a deal. He proffered a view that he would rather be “dead in a ditch” 
(BBC News, 2019) than ask Brussels for a further extension. In the fisheries context, 
Johnston reconfirmed that the UK would exit the CFP and become a coastal state on 
31st October 2019. Boris Johnson’s proposal to prorogue parliament precipitated the 
proposal of a Bill by Hilary Benn designed to stop Johnson taking the UK out of the EU 
on 31 October 2019 without a Brexit agreement. The Bill following its passage through 
parliament became the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 and it places a 
legal obligation on Johnson to seek a further Article 50 extension to 31st January 2020 if 
a withdrawal agreement is not agreed by 19th October 2019. Johnson proposed a 
motion for an early UK general election but that motion failed to achieve the required 
two thirds majority. At the time of writing, and in this ever changing political 
environment, the Queen gave the Bill royal assent and the European Union 
(Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 is now on the statute books. The UK Parliament was 
prorogued until 14th October 2019 but recalled on 25th September following the 
Supreme Court decision that found Johnson’s proroguing to be unlawful. Johnson’s 
73 
 
view was that passage of the Bill undermined his ability to negotiate a deal and he 
proposed an early general election but the House of Commons opted against Johnson’s 
proposal to precipitate a general election.  
   
The next chapter examines fisheries in an international context and existing coastal 
state arrangements. The five scenarios outlined include: ratification of withdrawal 
agreement; renegotiation of withdrawal agreement; crash-out Brexit; no Brexit; and 
extension of Article 50 withdrawal period. These will be analysed in the next chapter.   
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Irrespective of the type of Brexit we encounter, including a no deal Brexit, it is clear 
that a dialogue on the future relationship between the EU and the UK will be 
necessary. A two year negotiating period has been proposed in the orderly withdrawal 
agreement while, in the case of a no Brexit (the withdrawal of Article 50 notification by 
the UK), the status quo will pertain. In such circumstances, negotiation will be 
necessary to find a solution where the UK can back down in a politically graceful 
manner and subsequently negotiate a future relationship with the EU where all 
member states can by satisfied with the structures going forward.  
 
In the event of a hard (crash-out) Brexit, while it is likely the situation will be more 
difficult, it will nonetheless be a priority for both the EU and the UK to find a suitable 
future relationship at the earliest juncture. Fisheries is a relatively small sector when 
compared to others at an EU level, and while many sectors will undoubtedly be 
considered in any Brexit negotiations, it is likely that fisheries will be among the areas 
that will present particular difficulties. In such circumstances access to UK waters, 
access to fish, avoidance of displacement of other EU fishing vessels into the Irish EEZ, 
and trade in seafood will be of paramount importance and interest to the Irish seafood 
industry. This chapter examines existing relationships between the EU and a selection 
of international organisations and third countries that have seafood interests with a 
view to exploring the optimum solution for the Irish seafood industry in a post-Brexit 






Trade with Third Countries 
 
Official statistics published by Eurostat, the EU statistical service, show the trading 
statistics with trading partners. The EU is the world’s largest market and its two largest 
trading partners are China and the USA. The EU imports most goods from China, with 
the value of imports from China increasing by 84% between 2008 and 2018. Most of 
the imports from China in 2018 (97%) were manufactured goods. Figure 4.1 shows the 
value of trade in 2018 for the EU’s largest trading partners.  
 
Figure 4.1: EU Trading Partners in 2018  
Trading partner Imports to EU 
€Billion 




€395bn €215bn -€185bn 
USA (Eurostat, 
2019) 
€267bn €406bn +€139bn 
Russia (Eurostat, 
2019) 
€168bn €85bn -€83bn 
Switzerland 
(Eurostat, 2019) 
€109bn €157bn +€48bn 
Norway (Eurostat, 
2019) 
€85bn €54bn -€30bn 
Source: Eurostat 
Relying on the benefits achieved under the CAP and the CFP the EU, albeit in the face 
of increasing populations, is near to self-sufficient in agricultural products. The EU 
exports almost as much food and beverages as it imports. However demand for 
seafood in Europe outstrips production and demand for seafood continues to grow. 
The EU Fish Market report (European Commission, 2018) shows that in 2015 the 
average EU consumption of Seafood increased to 24.33Kg per capita, and in 2017 
imports of seafood into the EU reached a record high of €25.3b. While exports from 
the EU are principally finished products, the EU is heavily dependent on external 
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sources of energy and raw materials for manufacturing. Of particular note is the 
importation of gas and oil from Russia and Norway and the substantial trading deficit 
that the EU runs with both of these countries. This is significant in the context of the 
relationship that Russia and Norway have with the EU and the potential effect this 
relationship may have on fisheries and trade in seafood. While the UK was an exporter 
of energy in 2004 when oil and gas fields were at peak production, that situation has 
now reversed and in 2017 the UK imported 36% of the energy it used (Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2018). Accordingly, the UK cannot be directly 
compared to Norway or Russia in this context. 
 
The EU has a single external trade policy: the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Under 
the CCP, member states delegate authority, within defined parameters, to the 
European Commission to negotiate their external trade relations with the aim of 
leveraging the combined bargaining power of the EU in negotiating trade agreements. 
The goals of the CCP are to promote and develop world trade, to progressively abolish 
restrictions on international trade and to lower customs barriers. Without a CCP a 
common Customs Union would not be possible and Single Market and Monetary Union 
would not be possible. Member states are prohibited from entering into trade 
relationships with third countries on a unilateral basis unless such negotiations are 
carried out in the context of the CCP. This area, in particular, was problematic for the 
UK and it is likely to become an issue in any future post-Brexit negotiations in the 
context of the Northern Ireland Backstop as well as general trade discussions. Within 
the CCP there are a number of instruments including: 
 
 Common External Tariff: Each member state agrees to apply the same 
tariffs on imports entering the State from outside the EU. 
 
 Import quotas: Member states agree to impose EU level quotas on 
certain products being imported into the EU. Due to the single market 
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and the free movement of goods and services, import quotas could not 
be monitored on a State level. Products being imported into the EU have 
to be imported through a Border Inspection Post which has been 
approved by the European Commission for the importation of that 
particular product.  
 
 Anti-dumping measures: The European Commission has the power to 
impose minimum price levels and import tariffs if the price of a product 
entering the EU is set at a level that is likely to harm internal EU 
producers. 
  
 Voluntary Export Restraints: The European Commission and the 
importing/exporting third country agree to limit the volume of goods 
imported/exported. This measure is usually agreed in a context where 
anti-dumping measures are likely to be imposed in the absence of such 
an agreement. 
 
Other minor measures used to restrict free trade include: export promoting measures 
(trade fairs, etc.), countervailing duties (in response to export subsidies in exporting 
third countries), safeguarding clauses (allow World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
members to suspend normal rules in certain circumstances) and rules of origin (which 
set out the proportion of a product that must be added locally to qualify the product as 
originating within the EU or in a state with a EU preferential trading agreement. 
 
The EU Commission holds responsibility for proposing the legislation underpinning the 
Common Commercial Policy which must be adopted by Council and the European 
Parliament. The EU Commission is the sole competent authority for managing the 
policy and negotiating all trade agreements under the policy. Any external negotiations 
are conducted within the mandate given by the Council and must be formally adopted 
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by Council and the European Parliament before becoming law. Unusually, the EU 
Commission holds a power of executive decree in relation to actions taken under the 
policy but any actions taken by the EU Commission under the power of executive 
decree can be reviewed by Council and the European Parliament.  Such vesting of 
powers in the EU structures is a working example of neo-functionalism in the fashion 
envisioned by Jean Monnet. 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a legal agreement between 
many world countries and has similar goals to those in the EU Common Commercial 
Policy. The EU, as the world’s largest trading block, can make significant gains from a 
liberalisation of world trade and has been a key player in the negotiation of GATT 
agreements. Under the Uruguay round of GATT, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
was established on 1 January 1995. While the WTO is the successor to GATT, the 
agreements reached at GATT are still in effect under the WTO regime. GATT and WTO 
have successfully reduced tariffs over the years since GATT was first set up in 1947. The 
Doha round of negotiations covering tariffs, non-tariff measures, agriculture, labour 
standards, environment, competition, investment, transparency and patents 
commenced in November 2001 and has not yet concluded.   
 
The world financial crisis forced a significant number of WTO members to adopt a 
more protectionist approach to protect their state interests and, in particular, the 
United States came under such pressure. Recent trade restriction manoeuvres by US 
President Donald Trump’s administration has stressed GATT relations to 
unprecedented levels. It seems likely that the introduction of tariffs and counter 
measures will continue to escalate putting advances made by the WTO in jeopardy. 
 
It should be noted that in default of an agreement between the EU and the UK, the 
GATT/WTO tariff regime automatically applies. In the event of a hard (crash-out) Brexit 




The EU, as a trading body, has many bilateral preferential trade agreements. These 
agreements are more likely to come into focus to find a possible post-Brexit trading 
solution. The agreements grant various levels of access to the EU Single Market and are 
listed in Figure 4.2 in order of most advantageous for the trading partner to least.  
 
Figure 4.2 EU Agreements With Third Country Trading Partners   
Arrangement Third country trading partner 
European Economic Area (EEA) Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
Stabilisation and association agreements Balkan States 
Free trade agreements Canada, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Lebanon, South Korea 
Partnership agreements African, Caribbean and Pacific former 
colonies of European countries 
Generalised System of Preferences which 
gives privileged access for certain 
products 
Developing countries 
Mutual recognition agreement USA 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements Ten members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Inter-Regional Association Agreements Andean Pact, Mercosur, Central American 
Customs Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Various other trade agreements others including China, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Pakistan and Mexico 
 Source: EU Commission 
International Fisheries and the Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations  
 
The EU is a global player in the development of world fisheries and a key player in the 
development of international fisheries law and the governance of international 
fisheries. The EU also has direct fishing activity or economic interests in many 
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international fisheries. Furthermore the EU is the largest world market for seafood. 
These are factors which underpin the EU, currently representing 28 member states, as 
a significant player on the world fisheries stage. 
 
Prior to the adoption of UNCLOS international fisheries governance was effectively 
almost non-existent, and many examples can be found of confrontation between 
conflicting nations on fisheries matters in international waters. Although UNCLOS was 
not finally adopted until 1982, on 1 January 1977 many coastal states declared EEZs of 
200 miles. UNCLOS provides a platform to settle international maritime disputes but 
also imposes obligations on coastal states in relation to the management of fisheries 
and, in particular, fisheries that are shared by neighbouring coastal states. UNCLOS, 
which had been in negotiation since 1958, was the first significant international marine 
law development since the London Fisheries Convention of 1964 which, inter alia, 
introduced the 12 NM territorial seas (see chapter 3). In most cases the rights of 
coastal states to exploit the resources in their area of jurisdiction have been well 
consolidated and by and large are widely respected. UNCLOS was followed in 1995 by 
the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA). These two significant pieces of 
legislation provide the cornerstone for international fisheries management. While most 
countries have ratified UNCLOS and UNFSA, it should be noted that UNCLOS has still 
not been ratified by some coastal states including the USA – this however may be due 
to other areas of UNCLOS rather than fisheries as the USA has ratified UNFSA. From an 
international fisheries perspective, one significant element of the UNFSA is the reliance 
on Regional Fishery Management Organisations (RFMOs) to turn the principles of the 
UNFSA into working management solutions. A second is the importance placed on 
developing countries and on ensuring that developing countries can avail of their 
rightful share under the UNFSA. 
 
There are a number of situations where, in addition to the European Commission, EU 
member states also have individual membership and robust debate is ongoing as to 
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whether the EU should have one vote at RFMOs or if each constituent EU state should 
have a vote. This question remains unresolved at a general level, but in the majority of 
cases (and in particular RFMOs that deal exclusively with fisheries management) the 
EU, represented by the European Commission, has one vote. The EU is currently a 
contracting party to 14 RFMOs. Some of the more notable for this thesis include: the 
International Commission for the conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (NAFO). In these three organisations, the EU Commission represents all 
member states, the Commission has one vote, and no individual EU member state has 
an individual membership. The exclusive competence of the EU on the conservation 
and management of fish resources implies that international cooperation for the 
purpose of managing shared fishery resources is the responsibility of the Union and not 
of individual member states. While EU fishing vessels currently operate in fisheries 
governed by each of these three organisations it is also important that the EU, as a 
global player in fisheries governance, be an active participant in all RFMOs including 
those where EU fishing vessels do not currently operate. 
 
Development of policy within the RFMOs has, in many cases, been closely linked with 
the development of the EU CFP. These links are bi-directional with many important 
initiatives being developed by one or the other and subsequently adopted by both. 
Membership of the EU, rather than individual EU member states, has been an 
important factor in achieving this dovetailing of policy development. There are many 
examples of policy initiatives that were initiated in the RFMOs and that are currently 
features of the CFP e.g. the Atlantic Swordfish recovery plan adopted by ICCAT in 1998 
was a precedent for CFP long term stock recovery plans such as the hake recovery plan. 
 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing 
 
Measures to prevent Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) are conceivably 
the single most important initiative that has been implemented. These measures, 
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which were initially established by ICCAT long before the EU adopted them, provide a 
process to initiate implementation of international seafood trade sanctions against 
states that are not complying with the agreed anti-IUU measures and have been 
“blacklisted”. The EU assumes responsibility for compliance of all member states with 
appropriate measures included in the CFP (e.g. EU operators who fish illegally 
anywhere in the world face substantial penalties and/or fines linked to the value of 
their catch). Third countries are obliged to certify fishing operations and maintain 
records for their own fishing vessels. Measures to prevent IUU fishing are important in 
the context of Brexit, and particularly so if the UK becomes a third country as 
certification processes are more stringent for third countries and have the potential to 
inhibit trade arrangements. 
 
While ICES provides scientific advice on fisheries to the European Commission, many of 
the RFMOs have their own scientific advisors. Some, including NEAFC and the North 
Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organisation (NASCO), also use ICES for scientific advice. 
It is important, whatever the source, that the scientific advice from different sources is 
aligned to underpin accurate calculation of fishing opportunities for particular fish 
stocks. In this context there is long-standing co-operation among the organisations 
providing fisheries scientific advice. 
 
Another area where close co-operation is required is enforcement for breaches of 
fisheries regulations. One of the criticisms levied on the RFMOs is a lack of capacity to 
enforce regulations. However, the RFMOs use the control authorities of all members, 
including the EU to undertake the control functions at sea while, as mentioned above, 
the RFMOs have other strong tools available such as the ability to recommend 
imposition of trade sanctions for significant breaches of IUU regulations. 
 
Operationally some RFMOs are more advanced than others. Strategic goals of RFMOs 
are similar to the CFP (biologically, economically and socially sustainable fisheries and 
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fishing communities) but some are better structured than others to advance these 
goals2.  
 
One success story that is particularly worthy of mention is the Bluefin Tuna, the stock 
which is managed on an international basis by the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and a Total Allowable Catch (TAC), for the stock 
is calculated on the basis of scientific advice on the status of the stock. The EU portion 
of that TAC is divided among EU member states on the basis of relative stability keys. 
However, Ireland could not show any official record of landings of Bluefin Tuna for the 
relevant reference period, and accordingly, Ireland has a zero TAC3. This is particularly 
irksome for Irish fishermen who can observe their fellow European fishermen fishing 
Bluefin Tuna and catching fish worth in excess of €1,000 each within sight of the Irish 
coastline, while the Irish fisherman is prohibited from targeting or landing that species. 
It is not long ago that the Bluefin Tuna stock was scientifically assessed and identified 
as depleted and requiring special conservation measures. ICCAT successfully 
implemented a recovery plan for Bluefin tuna, but now Irish commercial fishermen are 
calling for a cull of Bluefin Tuna on the basis that Bluefin are veraciously preying on 
commercial species in Irish waters4.  
 
Some RFMOs have been criticised for not actively and effectively pursuing these goals. 
In the case of NEAFC, negotiations on North Atlantic mackerel share-out are carried out 
by the Coastal Sates group. The Coastal States group (EU, Norway, Faroe Islands, 
Iceland, Greenland and Russia), unlike the NEAFC, does not have formal arrangements 
and often experience difficulties in reaching an informal agreed position. When an 
                                                          
2
 For example NAFO is recognised for its success in actively managing stocks and implementing recovery 
plans for stocks including Greenland halibut, cod and yellowtail flounder. 
3
 Italy found itself in a similar position and challenged the calculation of relative stability keys for Bluefin 
Tuna in the EUCJ with judgment (delivered on 25 October 2001) upholding the allocation keys as decided 
by the Council. 
4
 It is difficult to fathom that such a request could be accommodated in light of the immense effort 
expended on recovering the stock. Noteworthy is a pilot tag and release fishery to gather scientific 
information on Bluefin Tuna that Ireland has recently implemented. The ICCAT approved scheme is open 




informal agreed position is established it then has to be ratified by NEAFC and put 
forward to the December EU fisheries Council of Ministers to be considered in the 
context of setting the EU TAC for North Atlantic mackerel. The NEAFC has been 
criticised for its passive approach to management. This criticism was particularly sharp 
when NEAFC failed to take any action when Iceland declared a unilateral TAC for 2009 
of 112,000 tonnes for North Atlantic mackerel and the Faroe Islands declared a 
unilateral TAC of 105,000 tonnes for herring (Bjorndal & Nils-Arne, 2014). NEAFC 
inactivity on the declarations undermined the protection of the fisheries and flew in 
the face of scientific advice. It was left to EU fisheries commissioner of the day Maria 
Damanaki to step in and threaten sanctions on Iceland and the Faroe Islands following 
their unilateral declarations. 
 
The informal Coastal States group dynamically alters membership based on the 
distribution and biomass of the migratory (and often high value) fish stocks under 
discussion. NEAFC, unlike for example ICCAT or NAFO abdicates it decision-making role 
to the Coastal States group. Post-Brexit the UK will become a third country and, most 
likely, also a member of the Coastal States group. It is reasonable to expect that the 
hard to reach agreements will become even more difficult to achieve in a post-Brexit 
environment, and there is a case for considering whether it is now timely for NEAFC to 
alter its decision-making process to align it more closely with, for example, NAFO or 
ICCAT. 
 
Allocating fishing quotas among EU member states is a challenging operation, but 
when quotas have to be allocated on an international basis the problem becomes 
much more complex. Lado (2016) outlines the fundamental challenge of allocating 
fishing rights particularly for highly migratory resources with a precondition of good 
multilateral management and striving to find a balance between the rights of 
developing states in their own waters and highly developed states with a tradition to 
fish in those waters. Developing states lack the capital, tradition, technology and 
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expertise to prosecute fisheries which may lie adjacent to their coastline and need 
assistance with all these areas. In addition, if such assistance is provided then those 
developing countries will need to find suitable export markets within which to sell their 
fish. The EU has the expertise and is the largest world market for seafood. While the EU 
is sometimes criticised for exploiting fisheries in developing third countries, there are 
examples, such as Namibia, where thriving indigenous fishing industries have been 
developed. UK fisheries cannot be considered as developing and accordingly this thesis 
will not dwell on relationships that have been implemented for developing countries 
other than recognising the significant role that RFMOs play.  
 
International Fisheries Agreements 
 
Bilateral international fisheries agreements have been a feature of the CFP since the 
early days, and in a number of cases these types of agreements predate the CFP but 
are now recognised within the structures (e.g. the Voisinage arrangement allowing 
reciprocal access to Irish and Northern Irish 0 to 6 NM zones). International Fisheries 
agreements can be broadly classified under four distinct headings and whereas not all 
are likely to be important in the context of Brexit, it is likely that any future 
arrangements between the EU and UK will draw on some of these bilateral 
arrangements when searching for an acceptable formula and accordingly merit 
exploration. 
 
Mutual access agreement became necessary following the declaration of 200 
mile EEZs. Areas of the sea and fishing grounds that had been shared by countries 
became part of sovereign states and the prospect of being excluded from 
traditional fishing grounds became a reality for EU and non-EU states. To solve 
this issue it was necessary to agree arrangements with neighbouring countries on 
the management and exploitation of shared resources in each other’s waters. 
Arrangements were agreed, inter alia, with Norway, Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands and these arrangements merit closer consideration as they may become 
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particularly relevant in the context of Brexit. The principle of mutual access 
agreements is simply to allow each State to fish in the waters of the other. 
Inevitably, in practice, the agreements are often based on complicated criteria.     
  
Trade concession agreements were more popular in the past but are rarely seen 
in the modern era as other trade agreements have often superseded them. One 
of the more notable trade concession agreements was made between the EU and 
Canada in 1977. Canada was given access to the EU market to sell its fish in 
return for allowing EU fishing vessels to prosecute fisheries in the Canadian EEZ. 
Another example was an agreement made between the EU and Argentina in 
1993 which afforded tariff concessions on Argentinian hake entering the EU 
market. The development of WTO (and GATT) rules set a level playing field for 
tariffs for all countries and now any concession offered to one has to be made 
available to all. This measure has effectively made the use of trade concession 
agreements all but redundant as implementation would require a realignment of 
WTO rules.  
 
Financial Compensation agreements have been used, and continue to be used, 
by the EU to guarantee access by EU fishing vessels to the traditionally fished 
grounds of third countries (e.g. EU/Mauritania and EU/Morocco agreements). 
The continuation of these agreements over time has always been contentious 
(Lado, 2016) with the belief that the provision of financial compensation 
packages to third countries is immoral and promotes pillage of their fish stocks 
for low compensation. It is argued that assistance to promote indigenous fishing 
and provision of technical assistance and education on stock management would 
be more advantageous to those third countries. The use of public funds to pay 
compensation packages, that benefit private operators is hard to justify (Farnell 
& Elles, 1984). Often following agreement and payment of a compensation 
package the opportunities purchased are subsequently not exploited in full 
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(Lado, 2016). This type of agreement is less likely to come into the reckoning in 
Brexit negotiations.  
      
Private partnerships have been growing in popularity in recent years. The EU 
fishing sector, which is well developed technically and financially, has been 
seeking opportunities to enter partnerships with private sector or public sector 
operations in developing countries. With careful management, some third 
countries have benefitted from these arrangements with technical knowledge 
transfer to the indigenous population and capital investment in fishing vessels 
and seafood processing companies. In such arrangements the revenue is usually 
generated by charging a licence fee to the EU fishing vessel. 
   
EU Norway 
 
The EU has three fisheries agreements with Norway (European Union Commission, 
2019): 
 bilateral agreement (the North Sea and the Atlantic). 
 trilateral (Skagerrak and Kattegat (Denmark, Sweden and Norway). 
 neighbouring agreements (Swedish fishery in Norwegian waters of the 
North Sea). 
 
Among all EU agreements with third countries, the EU Norway bilateral agreement, 
while it is politically sensitive, is by far the most important, and perhaps also one of the 
oldest with the current agreement dating back to 1993. In financial terms the EU-
Norway agreement relates to quotas worth over €2 billion (European Union 
Commission, 2019) and annual consultations take place to agree management 
arrangements for stocks that straddle both EEZs, while another strand of the annual 
consultation framework is negotiation on exchange of fishing opportunities in each 
other’s EEZs. The agreements reached at these consultations are usually implemented 
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through the setting of Total Allowable Catches (TACs), quota exchanges and, in certain 
circumstances, technical measures which are set out in regulations. Many of the shared 
stocks occur in the North Sea.  
 
The EU/Norway relationship has been important and generally beneficial for both the 
EU and Norway (some commentators see the arrangement as more favourable for 
Norway than the EU). Some of the pillars that the CFP are built on were adopted due to 
their success in Norway5. In addition, the reliance on scientific advice to set TACs has 
now become standard practice in the EU and in Norway leading to the concept of 
adjusting fish outtakes to Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) to optimise the level of 
biomass that can be removed from a stock without endangering the future viability of 
that stock.  
 
Interestingly in the initial phases of seeking EU/Norway agreement, the EU proposed to 
base the Norwegian outtake on historical fishing catch records. However, Norway 
argued that many important stocks spent the early stages of their life in Norwegian 
waters before moving to EU waters as mature fish and accordingly, and so Norway 
should have increased access to the mature fish. The EU does not accept this concept, 
but it is conceivable that UK negotiators will use a similar argument in an attempt to 
undermine the continued use of relative stability in a post-Brexit world. It is also 
conceivable that alternatives to relative stability could be examined in future reforms 
of the CFP.  
 
The EU/Norway agreement includes, in some cases, long term management measures 
for the management of certain stocks (management plans). The exchange of fishing 
opportunities occurs for a number of different stocks of varying importance and value. 
In order to level the playing field across those stocks, a system of “cod-equivalent 
                                                          
5
 e.g. technical measures, the focused targeting of particular stocks in mixed fisheries and the avoidance 
of bycatch and juveniles 
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value” was implemented. In summary, the EU/Norway agreement is important in a 
fisheries context as it: 
 Allows access to fish stocks in Norwegian waters for EU fleets. 
 Influences how other EU stocks are managed.  
 Influences, by association, other bilateral negotiations (e.g. Greenland, 
Faroe Islands). 
 Influences, by association, NEAFC and associated Coastal States 
negotiations. 
 Is likely to be relied on, at least in part, by the UK in Brexit/ Post-Brexit 
negotiations. 
  
Is there an Alternative to Relative Stability?         
 
To ensure the greatest possible stability for over 30 years, the allocation of EU fishing 
opportunities to member states has been based on a predictable share of the stocks 
for each member state (Sobrino & Sobrido, 2017). Relative stability has worked 
reasonably well up to this point. While some criticism has been levied that the system 
is somewhat inflexible member states have continued to take a view that continuing to 
embrace relative stability is more attractive, and bears less risk, than opening 
negotiations on a new mechanism that could deliver unpredictable results, with 
winners and losers, in what is essentially a zero-sum game.  
 
When the reformed CFP was adopted in 2013 (EU Common Fisheries Policy, 2013) 
relative stability was retained as the mechanism for allocating fishing opportunities to 
EU member states. However, the same regulation also introduces a progressive 
discards ban (2015 to 2019) and obliges fishermen to land all fish caught at sea (the 
landing obligation). The landing obligation presents a major challenge for fishermen, 
particularly in mixed fisheries where, despite the development of more selective 
fishing gear, unwanted catches of a non-targeted species are a feature with every haul 
of the nets. Under the landing obligation, all fish in the nets must be landed and all fish 
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are recorded and balanced against the national quota of the member state. In some 
circumstances there is a possibility that the member state may exhaust the quota for 
one species in a mixed fishery and in these circumstances the member state is obliged 
to close a mixed fishery where there is a possibility of catching a species where quota 
has been exhausted (the choke species) even if there is adequate quota for the other 
species in the mixed fishery. This scenario is a real possibility in the whitefish fisheries 
(cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, etc.) in Ireland. There are a number of possible 
solutions to this problem but some of the potential solutions conflict with the principle 
of relative stability and accordingly raise a question around the compatibility of relative 
stability with the landing obligation. 
  
There are a number of mechanisms within the CFP that are used to good effect in 
smoothing some of the ripples created, in part, by relative stability and it is feasible 
that further use of these mechanisms could offer potential short term solutions and 
enhance the operation of relative stability (while it is likely the extension of these 
solutions would buy some time it is unlikely they would stave off the necessity for a 
major revamp of the fisheries management regime). Four of the currently used tools 
that could be considered for enhanced use include: 
 Quota swaps: member states exchange quota with other member states.  
 
 Quota transfers: may only be agreed as part of EU TAC & Quota Regulation and 
has only been allowed when applied to all member states with quota and 
where it applies to a stock that straddles two ICES management areas.  
 
 Quota uplift provisions under Article 16 (EU Common Fisheries Policy, 2013): an 
increase in quota to take account of unwanted catch that was previously 




 Flexibility mechanisms under Article 15 (EU Common Fisheries Policy, 2013): for 
stocks subject to the landing obligation member states may apply up to 10% 
flexibility on fish landings from one year into the next.     
 
Drivers of Change 
 
Changes in fisheries governance are urgently required for a number of reasons but the 
primary topical drivers are:  
 
 Climate Change and in particular the changing distribution of fish stocks due to 
climate change. 
 
 Brexit – the UK exit from the EU. 
 
 Potential incompatibility between the Landing Obligation/Discards Ban and 
relative stability. 
 
The UK is the EU’s third largest fishing nation and there is little doubt that the effect of 
Brexit will be nothing short of the remaking of fisheries management and governance 
in the Northeast Atlantic in general, and for the EU specifically (Harte, et al., 2019). To 
date changes to the CFP have been difficult to negotiate and have taken significant 
time periods to introduce (Stynes, 2012). In light of the current policy drivers, the 
luxury of time is unlikely to be available if stocks are to be protected and the principles 
of the CFP are to prevail. Brexit will likely require a renegotiation of the long-standing 
quota agreements and will fundamentally change the way in which fisheries in the 
Northeast Atlantic are governed. The EU may be facing a post-Brexit situation where 
the much smaller size of its remaining fisheries may undermine the stability of the CFP 
(Harte, et al., 2019). The next planned reform of the CFP is scheduled post 2020 and it 
is possible that a new radical, comprehensive and adaptable fisheries management 
regime is possible within that reform process spurred on by the significant issues 
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outlined above. While all these drivers are significant, it is clear that Brexit is by far the 
most immediate threat. It is possible that threat may be turned into an opportunity for 
the EU, but when considering the Irish context it is important to understand the risks 
and strive for an optimum solution for the Irish seafood industry and the country as a 
whole. 
 
Change in EU fishing governance is inevitable. Reform of the fisheries and aquaculture 
sectors is overdue and discussion on the CFP has been delayed in light of the questions 
that Brexit is raising. It is likely that the next iteration of the CFP will be shaped 
significantly by Brexit: Whether that is no Brexit, negotiation following a hard Brexit, or 
a future relationship negotiated during the two year transition period envisaged in an 
orderly Brexit. In any case, negotiation will be required. In a hard Brexit it seems 
reasonable to conjecture that the default position of the UK (the current stated 
position) will be to exclude all non-UK fishing vessels from the UK EEZ and in response 
UK vessels will be excluded from EU waters. 
 
Examining Fisheries Sector Post-Brexit Scenarios        
 
While a hard Brexit would be a detrimental blow to the Irish seafood sector, it is clear 
that, in any circumstances of Brexit, a negotiated future arrangement will be necessary. 
In the rapidly and ever changing landscape of Brexit a comprehensive analysis of the 
impacts of Brexit on the Irish seafood sector has not been possible. This thesis draws 
on the available literature and primary and secondary sources of information to 
develop scenarios, and analyse and rank those scenarios with a view to identifying an 
optimum solution for the Irish seafood sector in a post-Brexit world. With reference to 
the possible Brexit outcomes set out earlier possible solutions will be examined by 
posing the following questions which are the basis for this thesis: 
 Will the solution allow Irish fishing vessels access to fish in UK waters? 
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 Will the solution provide continued tariff-free access between Irish (EU by 
definition as Ireland is a member of the Single Market) and UK seafood markets 
(east/west and north/south)? 
 Will the solution continue to provide, at a minimum, a similar level of access to 
fish stocks as heretofore? 
 Will the impact of the solution lead to displacement of other EU member states 
fishing fleets from UK waters into the Irish fishing zone at unacceptable levels? 
 Is the solution suitable from an Irish seafood sector perspective? 
 
Scenario 1 – The Status Quo 
 
This scenario could apply if the UK withdrew the Article 50 notice and remained an EU 
member state. It could also apply for the full transition period if the deal was ratified 
by UK and EU27 parliaments or for any period of extension of the Article 50 notice 
period agreed by the EU and the UK. Under this arrangement, the UK would continue 
to operate under the EU CFP and continue to have access to the single European 
market.  
 
Access to waters: EU fishing vessels and third countries with appropriate arrangements 
with the EU would have access to waters in the UK EEZ, and UK fishing vessels would 
continue to have access to the EEZ of EU member states – European waters. 
 
Access to markets: It is important to the UK to retain access to a suitable market for its 
seafood produce given that the UK is a net exporter of seafood. Under this scenario the 
UK would have continued access to the EU market without the imposition of tariffs or 
other trade barriers. It is also significant that, under this arrangement, seafood could 
be exported from the UK to the EU under existing single market rules, and therefore 
without a requirement to provide sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) certification or IUU 
catch certificates. Existing EU food safety and food labelling regulations would continue 
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to apply. Under this scenario Ireland would continue to have access to the UK seafood 
market. In common with some of the other scenarios, Ireland’s seafood trade with the 
UK is important in the context of east/west trade but it is of particular importance in 
the context of north/south trade.   
 
Access to fish: Quotas for fish, as agreed and adopted under the CFP at the December 
Council of Fisheries Ministers, would continue to be available to the UK and to Ireland. 
The UK, as a member state, would continue to participate in TAC and quota 
negotiation. 
 
Displacement into Irish EEZ: Under this scenario it is unlikely there would be any 
displacement of EU fishing vessels from UK waters into the Irish EEZ as all the EU 
member states would retain the access they currently enjoy. Fishing fleets are slow to 
alter their fishing habits without good reason and the additional fuel and time required 
to steam from a European fishing port to the west coast of Ireland may not prove 
economically advantageous to other member states fishing fleets.   
 
Suitability of solution from an Irish Perspective: Whereas this would be an acceptable 
solution from an Irish perspective, it is unlikely that this arrangement could remain 
unchanged going forward, particularly in light of the requirement to reengage with 
overdue reform of the CFP. Aspects that are beneficial to Ireland under current 
arrangements (e.g. the Hague Preferences) would come under scrutiny in the course of 
any reform, with an associated risk that Ireland might lose some of the benefits it 
currently enjoys.  
 
Scenario 2 - United Kingdom Exclude All Non-UK Fishing Vessels  
 
This scenario could apply if the UK crashed out of the EU without an agreed deal and 
become a third country. The UK would make a clean break with the EU and reciprocal 
95 
 
access to markets would cease. This is the default position in a hard (crash-out) Brexit 
situation from the effective date of the hard Brexit up until a negotiated settlement is 
arrived at. 
   
Access to waters: Under this arrangement the UK would prohibit fishing vessels from 
all other countries from fishing in its EEZ and UK fishing vessels would be prohibited 
from fishing in EU waters. Access to fish in international waters would continue to be 
available. Enhanced certification (SPS, IUU, etc.) would be required for UK seafood 
imports coming into Ireland. Fishing vessels could only land fish into Ireland through 
specifically designated third country landing ports (Castletownbere and Killybegs 
Fishery Harbour Centres are the only currently designated third country landing ports), 
while direct landings of frozen fish from UK fishing vessels could only occur at a 
designated EU Border Inspection Post (Dublin is currently the only sea port with a 
designated BIP for fish in Ireland). Under current Irish legislation (Government of 
Ireland, 2019), sea-fishing vessels owned and operated within Northern Ireland would 
continue to have access to fish in Ireland’s 0-6 NM zone.    
 
Access to markets: Following a hard Brexit the UK would no longer have open access to 
EU markets and consequently Ireland would not have open access to the east/west or 
north/south UK market. In default of other arrangements, the WTO tariff arrangements 
would apply to seafood moving in both directions. In the case of fish being transported 
across the Irish north/south border for processing, packaging, sale, etc. the tariff would 
apply each time the fish crossed the border. This would, almost certainly, make the 
sale of such fish economically uncompetitive and undoubtedly lead to job losses and 
strain on fishermen, aqua culturists and seafood processors. 
 
Access to fish: Setting of TACs for shared stocks would likely be hugely contentious and 
could result in the EU setting autonomous TACs and taking the full share currently 
available to the EU27. The UK approach is unknown but the UK could decide to set 
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autonomous TACs based on its assessment of what it considers its rightful share. 
Ireland would continue to avail of the quotas allocated at the December Council of 
Fisheries Ministers but would be unable to catch any of that quota in the UK EEZ. While 
this would create a particular problem for our two most valuable fisheries (Atlantic 
mackerel and nephrops) it would be felt to some extent in most fisheries prosecuted 
by Irish fishing vessels. Fishing effort would likely be targeted within the Irish EEZ 
leading to concerns about sustainability as well as a risk of not catching the entire 
quota or catching the quota with fish that are not at peak value (e.g. low fat content).  
 
Displacement into Irish EEZ: Exclusion from the UK EEZ will also apply to all other EU 
member states. However, not all those member states can relocate to fishing grounds 
within their own EEZs to replace catches heretofore harvested from the UK EEZ. In such 
circumstances, it is inevitable that some of these fishing vessels will target the rich 
fishing grounds in Ireland’s EEZ. Together with the displaced Irish fishing fleet these 
additional fishing vessels will deplete fish stocks and potentially lead to conflicts at sea. 
On the run up to the previous Brexit date of 29th March 2019, the European 
Commission consulted with member states to find a regionally-based solution. One of 
the measures proposed was to ease the pressure on fishing grounds by introducing 
payments to fishing vessels to tie-up in port rather than fish. It is likely that under this 
scenario the tie-up scheme will be activated and perhaps some additional measures 
will also be considered.     
 
Suitability of solution from an Irish Perspective: This is the default position in a hard 
Brexit situation from the effective date of the hard Brexit up until a negotiated 
settlement is arrived at. The Irish fishing fleet currently catches over 40% of its fish in 
the UK EEZ and accordingly this scenario would have a serious impact on the Irish 
seafood sector and would be unfavourable from an Irish perspective. Even if this 
situation only pertained for a short period of time it would likely cause significant and 




Scenario 3 – Mutual Access Agreement 
 
This scenario could apply if a Brexit deal (new or existing) could be ratified by UK and 
EU27 parliaments and the transition period commenced, or through the negotiation 
that would have to follow a hard Brexit. This is the current arrangement in place for 
EU/Norway fisheries (European Union Commission, 2019) and also for other third 
countries including Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Under the agreement with Norway, 
consultations on management of joint stocks and the exchange of fishing opportunities 
in each other’s waters are held on an annual basis.  
 
Access to waters: Current arrangements between the EU and third countries cater for 
a licensing arrangement for EU fishing vessels that wish to fish in the third country EEZ 
and vice versa. The numbers licensed are limited to the agreed level, and obligations 
are imposed on the fishing vessel via the licence (e.g. obligation to report catch for the 
day by midnight of that same day). The visiting fishing vessel is subject to control and 
enforcement by the host authorities. The licence can be withdrawn for breaches of the 
agreement. Under EU/Norway arrangements, access levels are restricted on both sides 
and are very different to the open access regime within the EU. 
   
Access to markets: Norway is part of the EU’s single market as it is a member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), but it 
is not part of the customs union and accordingly it can set its own tariffs on goods 
imported from outside the single market. Goods are imported tariff-free from Norway 
into the EU, with exceptions for farm produce and fish which have special 
arrangements. The UK could adopt a similar approach, however, this would necessitate 
making an application for UK membership of the European Economic Area and would 
necessitate the UK effectively adopting EU regulations without having any input into 
the formulation of those regulations. One advantage for the UK would be access to the 




Access to fish: Similar negotiations to EU/Norway negotiations could be conducted 
between the UK and the EU on an annual basis to agree the management of shared 
stocks and to set fishing opportunities in each other’s waters for the following year. 
The share out of the TACs under this arrangement would likely open up discussion on 
the current relative stability model that the EU wants retained. In a post-Brexit world, 
it is likely this arrangement would result in a cut back on the EU share of impacted 
stocks. Under current arrangements with Norway the agreement reached is brought 
forward to the Council of European Fisheries Ministers to inform the setting of annual 
quotas for member states. The negotiations would take account of the scientific advice 
on fish stocks to set a sustainable outtake limit. Under this scenario the UK could not 
participate as a member state in setting EU quotas in future years, and accordingly an 
appropriate mechanism would have to be implemented to agree TACs. UK fishing fleet 
would have negotiated access to Irish fishing grounds as part of EU waters. This option 
carries a risk of igniting the debate around relative stability, firstly between the EU and 
UK and subsequently internally between EU member states. It also risks highlighting, 
and bringing into focus, the Hague Preferences that are such an important safety net 
for Ireland. 
 
Displacement into Irish EEZ: It is likely under this scenario that some EU fishing vessels 
currently operating in the UK EEZ would be accommodated to continue fishing in the 
UK EEZ, but it is unlikely that all vessels from the EU27 would be accommodated 
resulting in displacement for the remaining vessels into the Irish EEZ. In a zero-sum 
equation and taking account of the rich fishing grounds surrounding the UK, the EU 
could not offer the UK equivalent access and this model could alter the sharing 
arrangement to the detriment of the EU.    
 
Suitability of solution from an Irish Perspective: This solution carries high risk for 
Ireland as it would likely significantly reduce the level of access for Irish vessels to the 
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grounds they have traditionally fished in UK EEZ while also diminishing the Irish share 
of quotas.   
 
Scenario 4 – Trade Concession Agreement 
 
This scenario could apply if a Brexit deal (new or existing) could be ratified by UK and 
EU27 parliaments and a future trading arrangement could be negotiated and agreed 
during the transition period, or through the negotiation that would have to follow a 
hard Brexit. Under this arrangement the UK would exit the EU, including the single 
market, customs union and CFP and negotiate a trading agreement with the EU.  
 
Access to waters: UK waters would be available only to UK fishing vessels. In such 
circumstances, a fishing vessel departing from the Irish fishing port of Greencastle 
could no longer turn to starboard when exiting Lough Foyle and on the East coast the 
Irish nephrops fishing fleet would be excluded from the fishing grounds traditionally 
fished that are in the UK EEZ – the only fishing grounds available would be in European 
waters. 
 
Access to markets: Access to the EU seafood market could be allowed at concession 
rates but it is unlikely that this access would be reciprocal. This would be highly 
significant for an Irish seafood sector that is currently selling into the UK market as 
tariffs would apply to seafood moving to the UK either on the east/west trade route or 
crossing the border into Northern Ireland. This would lead to significant problems 
within the Irish seafood sector. The World Trade Organisation does not favour the use 
of agreements with trade concessions and WTO rules state that if favourable terms are 
given to one trading partner the same terms must be made available to all trading 
partners. Accordingly, use of the arrangement may prove impossible. In addition, the 
GATT/WTO policy is, where possible, to abolish trade restrictions and to promote 
world trade.   
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Access to fish: Under this scenario the UK would not grant access to its EEZ for EU 
fishing vessels and the EU would be unlikely to open its EEZs to UK fishing vessels.   
 
Displacement into Irish EEZ: This scenario would likely result in significant 
displacement of EU fishing vessels into the Irish EEZ. The problems associated with this 
displacement and the mitigation steps being planned by the EU are outlined above (see 
scenario 2). 
 
Suitability of solution from an Irish Perspective: This scenario would not be suitable 
from an Irish perspective as the negatives far outweigh the positives for the Irish 
sector. It is likely this scenario would cause significant difficulties for many areas of the 
Irish seafood sector. 
 
Scenario 5 – Access to EU Market is Traded for Access to UK Waters and Quota Share 
 
This scenario could apply if a Brexit deal (new or existing) could be ratified by UK and 
EU27 parliaments and a future trading arrangement could be negotiated and agreed 
during the transition period or through the negotiation that would have to follow a 
hard Brexit. This hybrid solution is based on scenario 3 (mutual access agreement) and 
scenario 4 (trade concession agreement) and sees a new relationship between EU and 
UK where UK grants access to its waters and quota share for EU27 vessels at the levels 
currently enjoyed in exchange for tariff-free access to the EU market. This solution 
might require a realignment of WTO rules 
 
Access granted to Norway under scenario 3 above is based on the concept of economic 
balance. Any increased access or increased TAC for EU vessels in Norwegian waters has 
to be compensated for by transfer of quotas to Norway (e.g. increased access for 
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Norwegian vessels to Blue Whiting). In assessing the overall economic relationship 
between the EU and Norway, the balance of trade and Norway’s capacity to provide a 
supply of fossil fuels to the EU have to be kept in mind. 
 
The UK has extensive and rich fishing grounds and in any scenario (other than the 
status quo) would have a surplus of seafood after satisfying the UK domestic market, 
while the EU has the largest world market for seafood with €56.6b spent on seafood by 
consumers in 2017. It is, however, important to consider trade at a higher level than 
just seafood. The UK will need tariff-free access to EU markets for many sectors and 
any negotiations on seafood should be conducted in the context of the future trade 
agreement. One of the bargaining chips that the UK can bring to the negotiating table 
is the rich fishing grounds within the UK EEZ.   
 
Access to waters: Mutual access arrangements have been used, in the main, in 
preparing for EU enlargement. From 1977 to 1985, the European Economic Community 
of the time agreed the allocation with Spain of a number of licences to allow access for 
Spanish fishing vessels to European Economic Community waters on the basis that it 
was a candidate for accession (Lado, 2016). Norway availed of, and continues to avail 
of, mutual access arrangements on the basis of economic balance. In a post-Brexit 
situation, the UK could licence EU27 fishing vessels to fish in its EEZ. The EU has already 
indicated that in such circumstances reciprocal arrangements would be made for UK 
fishing vessels that wished to fish in EU waters.  
 
Access to markets: This scenario would facilitate UK access to the EU seafood market 
and a mechanism for EU access to the UK seafood market based on the UK trading 
access and quota share for market access. EU access to UK markets would be of 
particular importance for north/south trade in Ireland as fish currently crosses over 
and back between both jurisdictions freely and in some circumstances the same fish 
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can traverse the border more than once. Also, much of the food for organic finfish 
aquaculture in Ireland is currently sourced in Scotland. 
 
Access to fish: The UK fishing fleet is currently not capable of harvesting the entire 
outtake from the UK EEZ. An expansion of the UK fishing fleet, of the order required, 
would take significant investment in new vessels and a number of years to achieve. In 
addition without tariff-free access to the European market, the UK would have to 
replace the EU market with an alternative within which to sell its surplus seafood. 
Accordingly, although inconsistent with the Brexit position of “keeping British fish for 
Britain”, allowing continued access for EU fishing vessels to the UK EEZ would suit both 
parties.   
 
Quota sharing arrangements would also be required and could be negotiated by 
reference to the economic balance achieved with the UK trading quota share for EU 
market access. 
 
Displacement into Irish EEZ: In circumstances where the entire EU fishing fleet that is 
currently operating in the UK EEZ could continue to operate there, licensed under the 
negotiated agreement, displacement into the Irish EEZ should not occur. 
 
Suitability of solution from an Irish Perspective: If the status quo is not available as a 
solution, then this solution is the most favourable from an Irish perspective. This 
solution would allow continued access for Irish fishing vessels in the UK EEZ, ensure 
quotas for Irish vessels at a similar proportion of TAC as currently available, facilitate 
access to the UK markets for Irish seafood without the imposition of tariffs and support 
cross-border trade on the island of Ireland. The solution also mitigates the risk of 




Summary of Scenarios and Ranking 
 
Figure 5.1 offers a summary, in tabular form of the five scenarios and adds a ranking 
assigned by the author on the basis of suitability (on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being most 
suitable and 5 being least suitable solution) of the solution from an Irish perspective. 






























1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 1 
2 No No No Yes No 5 
3 Partial Possible Partial Yes No 4 
4 No Possible No Yes No 3 




It is inevitable that dialogue and negotiation will be required to agree a future 
relationship between the EU and the UK. At the time of writing, it is not yet clear 
whether that dialogue will be with a backdrop of an orderly Brexit, a hard Brexit, or a 
reversal of Brexit. It will undoubtedly be a high stakes game in which we are likely to 
see considerations of international structures and organisations and international 
trade coming into play. In particular, consideration of WTO rules, the EU Common 
Commercial Policy, the preservation of the single market and the customs union will be 
core issues, and while fisheries is a relatively small part of the jigsaw, it is likely to be an 
area that attracts much attention. Cognisance will have to be taken of the international 
context of fisheries and the existing governance arrangements. The imposition of 
tariffs is likely to be a difficult area and the automatic imposition of tariffs by default in 
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the absence of an agreement will influence the dialogue timetable. Existing 
arrangements will be examined in the context of finding a fisheries solution with 
particular reference to the EU-Norway model likely. In addition, the heretofore 
sacrosanct EU fisheries touchstone of relative stability is likely to come under scrutiny. 
Furthermore, these issues and potential solutions will have to be considered in the 
context of climate change and the necessary adaptation and mitigation measures.  
 
Of the solutions currently within focus, the most favourable, from an Irish seafood 
sector perspective, is maintaining the status quo. In the event that status quo is not 
possible, the next best option, from an Irish perspective, is a hybrid solution based on 
mutual access and trade concessions where the UK trades access to UK waters and 





Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
The 23rd June 2016 Brexit referendum result to leave the EU by a majority of 52% was a 
major shock to then British Prime Minister David Cameron, to other EU member states 
and of course to Ireland. Of all the EU 27 member states, it is clear that Ireland has 
most to lose when the UK exits the EU, and while the effects of Brexit will impact on 
many sectors it is likely to have a very significant impact on the Irish seafood sector. At 
the time of writing, the shape of Brexit is not yet clear and options range from a crash-
out Brexit, to a negotiated withdrawal agreement, to a reversal of Brexit (withdrawal of 
the UK article 50 notice) and perhaps some other options that are not yet evident. 
While the DUP were kingmakers and held the political balance in the House of 
Commons, negotiating an alternative to the Northern Ireland backstop proved fruitless. 
Following loss of the whip by some dissenting Tory MPs and by-elections that the Tory 
party failed to win, the DUP is not in the strong position they held heretofore. Progress 
on the impasse on border arrangements between the EU and UK (in particular the 
Backstop arrangement) may now be possible but Johnson would have to be certain he 
no longer needs DUP support in the House of Commons before throwing them under 
the bus. 
 
On commencing research for this thesis in October 2017 it could not have been 
anticipated that Brexit would have taken such a circuitous path, and that two years on 
there would be still no obvious solution in sight. Research for this thesis was 
challenging due to the ever changing nature of the Brexit debate and a lag in the 
availability of academic material particularly on fisheries aspects of Brexit. 
 
Climate change, CFP reform and Brexit are all significant drivers of change for the 
seafood sector, but there is little doubt that Brexit offers the most immediate threat 
for the Irish seafood sector. It is clear that regardless of the flavour of Brexit, or indeed 
in the event of a reversal of Brexit, a huge challenge faces the EU and the UK to find a 
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suitable future working relationship. The seafood sector is likely to be one of the 
sectors that will require careful consideration when crafting that future working 
relationship and finding a balance that suits the EU and the UK. Some of that 
consideration may be in the context of centralised trade and market access 
negotiations which are, of course, very important for the seafood sector, but specific 
arrangements will be necessary for access to waters, access to fish, and limiting risk of 
displacement of fishing vessels from other EU member states into the Irish EEZ. Any 
solution for the seafood sector must, of course, be considered in the context of the CFP 
and international governance structures.  
 
It is vitally important that any post-Brexit solution protects the Irish seafood sector as 
well as fostering the goals of the CFP. This thesis examined the development of the 
CFP, the structure of the Irish fishing fleet and fishing opportunities, Brexit and its 
impact on the seafood sector, and fisheries in the international context. Following 
analysis of the policies, structures, constraints and issues this thesis developed, 
outlined, examined and assessed possible scenarios with a view to identifying the 
optimum solution for the Irish seafood sector, but cognisant that any solution also has 
to foster the goals of the CFP.   
 
The core goal of this thesis is to establish if there is an optimum post Brexit solution 
that fosters the principles of the CFP and protects the Irish seafood sector while 
protecting the fabric of coastal communities, the environment and fish stocks.  
    
At this point in time, much remains unclear about Brexit and the impacts of Brexit on 
fisheries and, in particular, the Irish seafood sector – we now stand in the calm before 
the storm of the greatest challenge the sector has ever faced while also grappling with 
the realities of climate change and a requirement for continued CFP reform. Despite 
the Brexit preparations that are being made, there are risks, known and unknown, 
lurking at every turn and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no 
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certainty of an optimal solution that protects the Irish seafood sector and fosters the 
goals of the European Union’s CFP at this point in time.  
 
From an Irish perspective, and cognisant of the continued fostering of the CFP goals, 
the optimal current solution is the status quo. This can, of course, only be achieved if 
the UK withdraws Article 50 notification and remains an EU member state. In what 
now seems the unlikely prospect of withdrawal of Article 50, it should be noted that 
the status quo does not provide a risk free long-term solution from the perspective of 
the Irish seafood sector for the reasons outlined above. Even in the most benign of 
scenarios, the status quo, the Irish seafood sector should prepare for a push to alter 
the relative stability model and attempts to renegotiate the Hague Preferences.  
 
It is possible that further options will come into play as the shape of Brexit becomes 
clearer. However, pending further clarity in the Brexit process, it is not possible to 
include further possible options in the analysis. 
 
Hope remains that as we progress towards some negotiated solution, the options will 
become more focused and common sense, and perhaps some creative thinking will 
prevail so that the principles of the CFP can continue to underpin the protection of 
coastal communities, the environment, seafood sector and fish stocks for the benefit of 
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